

SRH 011

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

in

SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC

(January, 1943 - October, 1943)

VOLUME IV

The Contributions of Communication Intelligence
to the Operations of the Commander of the United
States Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

(April-May, 1943)

10 December 1945

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(April and May 1943)

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INTRODUCTION

This volume is one of a series of historical studies which will be devoted to an attempt to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to submarine commanders operating under the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. It is hoped that correlation and interpretation of the source material available in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the United States Naval Communication Intelligence organization will produce valuable lessons for the future.

For the sake of convenience the year 1943 was selected as a beginning point for this series since it was an outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. Furthermore, since the records for this period are more complete than those of 1941 and 1942, it was felt that a more accurate appraisal of the worth of communication intelligence could be made.

During this period all American submarines operating below the equator and east of

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longitude 130° E were under the command of Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet; all submarine operations above the equator and west of longitude 130° E were the direct responsibility of the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The relationship of communication intelligence to the operations of submarines under the Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet, will be discussed in a different series, when research in the operational files of the command can be effected.

There were few activities during World War II which received so little attention as the campaign waged so successfully in the Pacific by the submarines of the United States Navy. Co-ordinated attacks by American submarines and air fleets from 1941 to 1945 resulted in the destruction of most of the Japanese merchant fleet, the crippling of Japanese industry by cutting off its source of supply, the hampering of Japanese Army and Navy movements, and the isolation of many Japanese garrisons. The destruction of over six million tons of merchant shipping meant that Japan could not

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effect its ambition of creating an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

As for the part played by American submarines in the elimination of Japan as a military power, statistics indicate that the greater part of Japanese shipping was already destroyed when Allied amphibious forces seized the bases which made possible daily air strikes at Japanese home ports. Although there is no need to enter the current controversy as to whether or not the B-29's won the Japanese war, it suffices to say that the far reaching effects of United States submarine warfare in the Pacific cannot be overlooked by any objective observer. As of August 30, 1945, 1256 Japanese ships had been sunk by American submarines.

During the war submarine operational authorities were in constant communication by a direct telephone line with the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization, and the information made available to them was used to such good advantage that many targets, which otherwise might easily have slipped by the submarine patrols, were sent to the bottom of the sea. This

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
does not mean that American submarines were not able to operate independently and effeciently on their own account. On some occasions, when the Japanese had changed their cipher systems and for a short period of time no information could be derived from their communications, American submarines sank almost as many, if not just as many, Japanese ships as when the Japanese messages were being read. Submarine operational authorities have pointed out, however, that the information made available when the Japanese cipher messages were being read currently was of great value in the carry over period till American naval cryptanalysts solved the new Japanese cipher systems. Analysis of previously deciphered messages supplied valuable data as to the favorite routes and procedures of Japanese merchant ships, and, thus, even when the flow of intelligence decreased temporarily American submarine commanders could be directed to productive areas.

Chart A shows the relationship between the number of Japanese messages translated by American naval cryptanalysts and the tonnage of sunken Japanese shipping.

Red Line - Tonnage sunk
Black Line - GZ Translations

Chart A

ASSESSED (JANAG) SINKINGS OF JAPANESE
MERCHANT SHIPS IN TONS (SHIPS OF 1000 TONS OR OVER)
COMPARED TO NUMBER OF NEGAT TRANSLATIONS OF
JAPANESE NAVY ENCRYPTED RADIO MESSAGES



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1945

1944

1943

1942

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Though United States submarines were not always able to sight targets reported to them by communication intelligence sources, submarine authorities have attributed much of their success to information derived from enemy communications. On April 14, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

...High percentage of submarine sinkings is based on ULTRA information ... (131237 NCR 1231).

On July 3, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet sent the following to the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization:

"Commander Submarine Force desires to express his admiration and appreciation to the officers of ConIntOrg for the splendid support and coverage given by you to the recent submarine operation in the Japan Sea. May the great success of this expedition repay you somewhat for your tireless efforts to strike this blow at the heart of the enemy's empire. It could not have been done without your help."

The use of communication intelligence helped revolutionize submarine strategy in the Pacific.

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for operational authorities, because of the continuous flow of communication intelligence which they were receiving, were able to station submarines in certain areas which would not normally be considered productive of targets. Though the routes of Japanese convoys were being constantly shifted to avoid reported American submarines, the messages announcing the change of course were deciphered and made available to American submarine commanders. Thus, many otherwise unavailable targets were provided, torpedoes were expended profitably, long patrols in unproductive areas were avoided, and the morale of officers and men was improved.

This volume outlines the relationship of Communication Intelligence to American submarines operating in the Pacific during April and May, 1943. Subsequent volumes will continue the story. Each volume has an appendix which contains the following material source for each case discussed:

A. Source of Intelligence

Japanese messages deciphered and translated by the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization.

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B. Operational Dispatch

A message containing the information derived from (A), sent by the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet to American submarines.

C. Submarine Action Report

Pertinent data extracted from the action report of the submarine or submarines concerned.

Chart B summarizes the results of action taken by United States Submarines from January through October, 1943, as a result of Communication Intelligence. Another general summary of results will be made in the volumes dealing with November, 1943 to December, 1944.

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CHART B

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

Grand Total - January-October 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 810

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 445

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 4
2. Submarine not in area..... 100
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 86
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 223
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine..... 5
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 20
7. Information cancelled as incorrect..... 7

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 354

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 120

- (1) Sunk..... 33
- (2) Damaged..... 56
- (3) No perceptible damage..... 16
- (4) Missed..... 15

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked... 234

- (1) Unfavorable position
of submarine..... 65
- (2) Rough weather-poor
visibility..... 16
- (3) Submarine attacked by
escorts..... 9
- (4) Target showed hospital
ship markings..... 3
- (5) Engaged with other
targets..... 137
- (6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure..... 4

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to charts, Jan.-Oct.)

- A. Positive..... 112
- B. Probable..... 11
- C. Possible..... 24

III. Number of Potential Targets for which
the Results Are Unknown..... 11

* The number of potential targets in each Case is

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derived from the number in the ComSubPac Ultra dispatch.

If, however, ComSubPac did not state the number but

merely described the target as a convoy, the target is reckoned as one (an escort is not counted unless specified as a destroyer or a large ship). But if the target was sighted, then the number named in the submarine patrol report is the number computed in the analysis. If

ComSubPac was indefinite, stating the target to be "several ships, the target, if not sighted, is counted as two. For example, in Case 41 of October

ComSubPac described the target as "2 AUXILIARY CARRIERS SEVERAL DESTROYERS". The target, which was not sighted, was reckoned as four.

Thus the reckoning is often arbitrary and therefore the figures are only approximate. This applies also to the reasons given for the failure of a submarine to sight, or to attack, an Ultra target assigned to it.

If none of the reasons listed in the analysis precisely cover a given case, the case is then reckoned under the most nearly equivalent reason. If two submarines are named as addressees, the reason reckoned in the analysis may be that of the first addressee

or it may be the reason of the majority if three or more submarines are action addressees (Case 47 of July).

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It should be noted that research in this regard was handicapped seriously by the fact that submarine commanders were under orders to omit all references to Communication Intelligence in their reports as will be seen in the following dispatches:

A. FROM: COMINCH 18/1836 May
TO: CTF 17
CTF 71
CTF 72
INFO: COMSOPAC
CINCPAC
PREC: DEFERRED

SUPER SECRET X ULTRA X WAR DIARIES OF SUBMARINES BASED WEST AUSTRALIA FOR MONTHS NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY CONTAIN NUMEROUS REFERENCES COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE X ALL MENTION THIS SOURCE MUST BE ELIMINATED FROM ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF PAST AND FUTURE DIARIES

B. FROM: CINCPAC 18/1836 May
TO: COMSOPAC
PREC: ROUTINE

PASS COMINCH 181837 TO COMSOPAC FOR ACTION

C. FROM: COMSOPAC 13/0935 July
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NFM
FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

.....
..... WHETHER ACTUALLY NOR BY IMPLICATION
SHOULD REFERENCE BE MADE TO ULTRA MESSAGES SENT
BY THIS COMMAND X SAME RULE APPLIES FOR WRITING
UP PATROL REPORTS

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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

April, 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 41I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 24

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 2
2. Submarine not in area..... 6
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 6
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 10
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine..... 0
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 0
7. Information cancelled as incorrect... 0

II. Number of Potential Targets sighted..... 16

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 3

- (1) Sunk..... 0
- (2) Damaged..... 1
- (3) No perceptible damage... 2
- (4) Missed..... 0

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked. 13

- (1) Unfavorable position
of submarine..... 4
- (2) Rough weather-poor
visibility..... 0
- (3) Submarine attacked by
escorts..... 0
- (4) Target showed hospital
ship markings..... 0
- (5) Engaged with other
targets..... 9
- (6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure..... 0

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to Chart-April)

- A. Positive..... 3
- B. Probable..... 0
- C. Possible..... 2

III. Number of Potential Targets for which
the Results Are Unknown..... 1(*) Convoy of unknown number of Ships has been
Considered as but one target.

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April 1943

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
1. 01-2010	<u>U.S.S. Pompano</u>	One unidentified ship and an escort moving down meridian 139E to arrive at 28-40N at 0300 (GCT) on April 3.	None	ComSubPac dispatch 01-2010 was not received by the Pompano.
2. 02-0332	<u>U.S.S. Pompano</u>	One unidentified ship and one small escort heading for Saipan to be at the following positions at 0300 (GCT) on the dates given: 31-50N, 139E April 2; 28-40N, 139E April 3; 25-30N, 139E April 4.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pompano was in the area but did not sight the target.
	<u>U.S.S. Pompano</u>	One unidentified ship enroute to Truk carry- ing Japanese troops to be at the following 0300 (GCT) positions on the dates given: 31-28N, 138E April 3; 26-40N, 138E April 4; 22-00N, 138E April 5.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pompano was in the area but did not sight the target.

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April 1942

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (date-time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
2.	(Cont.)	U.S.S. Tunny	One unidentified ship to be at 4-39N, 156- 06E at 0300 (GCT) on April 5 and at 6-34N, 152-28E at 0300 (GCT) on April 6.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tunny was in the area somewhat to the north and did not sight the target.
		U.S.S. Haddock	One unidentified ship making 9 knots en route to Palao to be at 10-20N, 132-55E at 0300 (GCT) on April 4.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Haddock was leaving the area on April 4 for its base because of a damaged conning tower.
3.	03-1815	U.S.S. Vahoo	One unidentified ship to be at 33-25N, 123- 15E and 35-32N, 122E at 0300 (GCT) on April 4 and 5 respectively.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Vahoo was returning to its base on April 4 and 5.
4.	04-0600	U.S.S. Haddock	Cconvoy (Speed 8 knots) to pass through 10- 47N, 132-56E at 2100 (GCT) on April 3 en route to Palao.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Haddock was returning to midway on April 4.

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April 1, 1943

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches No. (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
5. 05-0500	U.S.S. Haddock	One seaplane tender and five unidentified ships enroute from Saipan to Truk. Will stop at Saipan from 0300 to 0700(GCT) on April 7 for fuel.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Haddock turned aside to Saipan. At 2300(GCT) on April 6, it sighted a carrier off the harbor. At 0155(GCT) April 7 it saw two destroyers enter the harbor and leave at 0726(GCT). The submarine was unable to attack.
	U.S.S. Tunny	One unidentified ship carrying 600 Japanese to be at the following positions at 0300(GCT) on the dates given: 14-05N, 141-13E, April 7; 11-06N, 144-45E, April 8; 08-25N, 148-26E, April 9. From the April 9 position the ship is to move to a position two miles north of Pulap and then to West Channel, Truk.	None	See Case 5, 07-0723. ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tunny was busy with the convoy of carriers on April 9.

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April 1942

ComSubpac Operational Dispatches No. (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
5. 07-0723	U.S.S. Tunny	Convoy of 03-0500 containing two and possibly three auxiliary carriers to be 101 miles bearing 220° from the West Channel at Truk at 1500(GCT) on April 9. Scheduled to enter South Pass, Truk at 2100(GCT) the same day.	Positive	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Tunny sighted three carriers and two destroyers at 1228 on April 9 off South Pass and attacked successfully.
	U.S.S. Mike, to aid Tunny if possible.		None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Mike was too far to the east to aid the Tunny.
6. 08-0330	U.S.S. Pollock	One ship (Possibly tanker, with air coverage) to depart South East Channel of Jaluit at 0100(GCT) April 10, to arrive at Makin 2030(GCT) same day.	None	Radio reception very poor. Submarine report of these days in a secret letter--no contact mentioned in contact report.
7. 09-0350	U.S.S. Pompano	One warship enroute to Kure will be at 29-46N, 134-12E at 1030(GCT) April 13. Also one unidentified	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Pompano was in the area but was hampered by rough seas.

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April 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (date-time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Position Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
7.	(Cont.)		ship will pass 29-26N, 140-35E at 0300(GCT) on April 9 and at 32- 34N, 139-30E at the same time the next day.		
		U.S.S. <u>Pike</u>	One army transport to be at 6-20N, 149-55E at 0300(GCT) April 10 and at 6-40N, 146-14E at the same time the next day. Scheduled to arrive at Truk some time later.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received but later discarded by the pike in favor of a later dis- patch.
8.	10-1825	U.S.S. <u>Tunny</u>	One army transport arriving North Pass, Truk, at 0400(GCT) on April 11.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tunny was in this area but did not sight the trans- port.
9.	11-0547	U.S.S. <u>Runner</u>	Convoy to be at 22N, 123E at 0300(GCT) April 16 and at 25N, 127E at 0300(GCT) April 17.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Runner patrolled this area but sighted only patrol boats.
		U.S.S. <u>Stingray</u>	Convoy to be at 33-40N, 129-49E at 0300(GCT) on April 19.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 2324(GCT) April 18 the Stingray sighted a convoy of four freighters and escorts at 27-43N, 126-24E but did not attack.

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April 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
10.	12-0547	U.S.S. <u>Seawolf</u>	Submarine to be at 9N, 152-54E at 1000 (00T) April 11; 29- 32N, 146-57E at 1500 (00T) April 14 and at 34-46N, 139-38E at 2100 (00T) April 15.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Seawolf</u> was not in this area.
		U.S.S. <u>Stingray</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Stingray</u> was not in this area.
		U.S.S. <u>Pompano</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Pompano</u> was in this area but did not sight the sub- marine.
11.	12-1945	U.S.S. <u>Seawolf</u>	Convoy of two ships to be at the follow- ing positions at 0300 (GCT) on the dates given: 17-44N, 149-49E, April 14; 20-10N, 151-20E, April 15; 22-34N, 152-53E, April 16. Due to arrive at Marcus Island at 2100 (GCT) April 16.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Seawolf</u> contacted a freighter or passenger- freighter with escort at 21- 06N, 151-54E on April 15. The freighter was badly damaged.
12.	13-0611	All subs copying NPH for	Convoy or ship of un- known type making 9 knots to be at the	None	The <u>Pompano</u> , in the area in which the target was expected did not sight any large enemy

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April 1943

ComSubpac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions (N/V/E)	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
12. (Cont.)		following positions at 0300(GCT) on the dates given: 24N, 132E, April 13; 30-08N, 135-34E, April 15; 35-45N, 139-50E, April 17.		ships March 15-17.
13. 13-0930	U.S.S. Pike	The Chokai and a destroyer as escort left Truk at 2300(GCT) April 12 enroute to Rapaui.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Pike was tracking a convoy these dates.
14. 14-1242	U.S.S. Pike	Convoy with one escort vessel enroute from Truk to Palao, noon position (I time) on April 14 will be 6-32N, 149-20E and on April 15 will be 6-12N, 144- 31E.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. Distance makes it impossible to execute mission assigned.
15. 15-0125	U.S.S. Stingray	One ship traveling 16 knots to be at 22-50N, 136-35E at 1000(GCT) on April 16 and at 11- 50N, 143-55E at 1300 (GCT) on April 18.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Stingray sighted a four ship convoy at 28-45N, 138- 23.5E at 0630(GCT) on April 16 but did not attack.

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April 1942

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
15. 15-0151	U.S.S. Permit	Convoy of 15-0125 to be at 11-40N, 143- 55E at 2000(GCT) on April 18; 10-15N, 150E at 0300(GCT) on April 20 and at 8-30N, 152- 50E at 2000(GCT) on April 20.	None	ComSubPac dispatch apparently not received. The Permit was patrolling this area but did not sight the ship.
16. 15-1422	U.S.S. Permit	Two auxiliary carriers escorted by two destroyers due to depart North Channel, Truk, at 2245(GCT) April 15 on course 320.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 2100(GCT) April 16 the Permit sighted a convoy of two freighters and two destroyers at 13-15N, 147- 12E, too close to port (Saipan) to attack.
17. 15-1815	U.S.S. Runner	Convoy, speed 9.5 knots, enroute from Sama to Takao. Noon posi- tions (I time) are as follows: 19N, 112E, April 16; 20-33N, 115-16E, April 17; 21-48N, 117-57E, April 18; due to arrive at Takao at 0700 (I time) on April 19.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Runner was northeast of this target searching for a convoy reported in an earlier dispatch.

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April 1943

No.	ComSubpac Operational Dispatches (Date-time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
18.	16-0908	U.S.S. Pike	6,000 ton freighter arriving at Wakeal Island at 2100(GCT) on April 16. Noon positions for April 15 and 16 (I time) will be 6-30N, 149-30E and 7N, 146-10E.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Pike patrolled this area but did not sight the Ultra freighter.
19.	16-0223	U.S.S. Runner	Unidentified ship to the following positions April 19-22 respectively at Noon (I time): 18-52N, 120-21E; 21-33N, 124-38E; 24-17N, 130-12E and 28-45N, 135-10E.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Runner was in an area west of the target.
		U.S.S. Seawolf		None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Seawolf was in an area east of the target.
20.	22-0736	U.S.S. Pike	Convoy and small es- cort vessels to be at the following 0300(GCT) positions on April 22-24: 10-30N, 143-50E; 08-30N, 145-30E; 07-20N, 149-40E.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Pike was not in the area and decided the distance too great to the target.
		U.S.S. Permit		None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Permit was in this area but did not sight the target.
	23-0632	(additional information for Pike and Permit)			See above.
		Convoy of 22-0736 to be at 06-53N, 150-30E at 1600(GCT) April 24.			

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CHAPTER IV

April 1, 1943

Case 1

On April 1 the Chief of Staff of the Yokosuka Naval District listed the noon positions from April 2 to 7, inclusive, of a Japanese ship and its escort sailing from Yokosuka to Rabaul by way of Saipan and Truk.¹

Later in the same day this Ultra information reached ComSubPac who, in dispatch #48 (012010), ordered the U.S.S. Pompano to intercept the ship in the vicinity of its April 3 noon position, 28-45 N, 139 E. Unfortunately, however, ComSubPac serial 48 was one of two dispatches which the Pompano failed to receive on this patrol.²

April 2, 1943

Case 2

In a long dispatch sent early (0332 GCT) on April 2 ComSubPac repeated for the U.S.S. Pompano

1 - Appendix IV, Case 1, A-1., hereafter referred to as IV, Case 1, A-1.

2 - IV, Case 1, B-1.

3 - IV, Case 1, C-1.

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the information which the submarine had missed the day before (serial 48; see Case 1 above)⁴. The dispatch also informed the Pompano that another unidentified ship might be expected at 31-28 N, 138-00 E at 0300 (GCT) April 3, at 26-43 N, 138-00 E April 4, and at 22-04 N, 138-00 E April 5.⁵ Moreover, the U.S.S. Fanny was informed that an unknown type ship bound for Truk would pass through position 4-39 N, 156-06 E at 0300 (GCT) April 5 and 6-34 N, 152-28 E April 6.⁶ This dispatch concluded with a fourth bit of Ultra information for the commander of the U.S.S. Haddock who was told to expect an unidentified ship headed for Palau at 10-20 N, 132-55 E at 0300 (GCT) April 4.⁷

The Pompano on April 2-3 was patrolling in rough weather off the coast of Honahn watching the Empire-Truk lanes but did not sight either of the Ultra targets assigned to it.⁸

The Fanny sighted nothing while patrolling north of Mogami Bank, off Truk, on April 6, on the afternoon of which the Ultra target was due at Truk from the southeast. On April 7 at 1234 (GCT), while patrolling west of McLaughlin Bank, northwest of Truk, an AP

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- 4 - IV, Case 2, B-1.
 - 5 - IV, Case 2, B-1 - A-1 - A-2.
 - 6 - IV, Case 2, B-1 - A-3 - A-4.
 - 7 - IV, Case 2, B-1 - A-5.
 - 8 - IV, Case 2, C-1 - C-2.

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with destroyer escort was sighted and attacked, but because of the differences in time and position this can hardly have been the Ultra target.⁹

The Haddock was not in position to intercept its Ultra target on April 4 near Palau, for on that day the submarine was returning home to repair damages to its conning tower.¹⁰

April 3, 1943

Case 3

From a partial decryption of a Japanese ship movement report were recovered two noon positions for April 4 and 5 at points 33-25 N, 123-15 E and 35-32 N, 122 E respectively.¹¹

Sending these two positions to the U.S.S. Wahoo, ComSubPac, on April 3 added that the ship would not have an escort.¹²

Since radio reception was complete, the submarine received the dispatch; however, no action report was given for April 3 through April 5. Apparently the Wahoo was en route to its base at Midway since it arrived there on April 6. There was no contact, therefore,

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- 9 - IV, Case 2, C-4 - C-5.
 - 10 - IV, Case 2, C-6 - C-7.
 - 11 - IV, Case 3, A-1.
 - 12 - IV, Case 3, B-1.

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with the Ultra target.¹³

April 4, 1943

Case 4

According to a Palau Guard Force operational order a "T-2" convoy of five Japanese ships would arrive at 1200 (I) on April 3 at an unrecovered position of north latitude and 132-40 E, while another convoy, designated as "K-2", would arrive at position 10-47 N, 132-56 E at 0600 (I) time on April 4. Escorts were detailed to meet the convoys and accompany them to Palau.¹⁴

On April 4 at 0600 (GCT) ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Haddock that a convoy (K-2) was to have arrived at 10-47 N, 132-56 E at 2100 (GCT) April 3 en route to Palau.¹⁵ However, on April 4, the Haddock, having suffered severe damage in its successful encounter with another Ultra target the day before (see III, Case 34),¹⁶ was returning to port.

April 5, 1943

Case 5

-
- 13 - IV, Case 3, C-1 - C-2,
 - 14 - IV, Case 4, A-1.
 - 15 - IV, Case 4, B-1.
 - 16 - IV, Case 4, C-1 - C-2.

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From a Japanese message of April 3

Communications Intelligence learned that an important
convoy of some six ships carrying aircraft would leave
Yokosuka at 1000 (I) April 4 and arrive at Truk, South
Channel, at 0630 (I) April 10. The convoy was made up
of warships, - the carrier Otaka, a possible seaplane
tender, and destroyers. Several positions en route
were given and arrangements made for several of the
ships to refuel at Saipan on the way.¹⁷

On April 5 ComSubPac asked the U.S.S.
Haddock to look for a seaplane tender and five unknown¹⁸
ships at Saipan between 0500 and 0700 (GCT) April 7.
Also, the U.S.S. Tunny was told to look for the same
convoy at a position off the West Channel of Truk at
1500 (GCT) April 9. Finally, this dispatch repeated
for the Tunny information previously sent (on April 2;
see IV, Case 2) about an unidentified ship approaching
Truk from the east and due at East Channel at 0100¹⁹
(GCT) April 9.

The Haddock, returning home with a
damaged conning tower, turned aside at Saipan. At

-
- 17 - IV, Case 5, A-1 - A-2,
 - 18 - IV, Case 5, B-1,
 - 19 - IV, Case 5, B-1 - A-3.

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10 December 1945

2300 (GCT) April 6 the submarine sighted an aircraft carrier and several destroyers off the harbor.
20
Conditions prevented an attack.

In a second dispatch (serial 58) regarding this important convoy ComSubPac on April 7 repeated to the Tunny the position the convoy was scheduled to reach off the West Channel April 9 and added that it was scheduled to enter the South Pass about 2100
21
(GCT) on the same day. The U.S.S. Pike was asked to aid the Tunny if it could reach the area in time.

At 1228 (GCT) April 9 the Tunny sighted the convoy, three auxiliary carriers and two destroyers in two columns. Two smaller carriers were approaching off the Tunny's port bow and a large carrier off the starboard. The submarine had maneuvered into a position ahead and between the two columns when the approach of three small torpedo boats, or landing craft, dead ahead speeded the plan of attack. The Tunny, now between the columns, swung her bow 90 degrees to the right, dived to 40 feet, and fired four torpedoes from the stern tubes at the column of two carriers. All four were direct hits.

20 - IV, Case 5, C-1 - C-3.
21 - IV, Case 5, B-2.

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10 December 1945

From the bow tubes six torpedoes struck at the large carrier, of which three exploded. More explosions followed while the Tunny left the area safely despite a depth charge attack.²²

This was a positive contact with the more important Ultra target, the convoy from Yokosuka (the single unidentified ship which ComSubPac on April 5 had told the Tunny to expect at Truk at 0100 (GCT) April 9 was not sighted). The captain of the Utaka verified the attack when he optimistically reported "no damage". One of the other two carriers, the captain's report revealed, was the Churyo.²³

The Pika received ComSubPac's Ultra serial 58 but was too far to the east to assist the Tunny.²⁴

April 8, 1943

Case 6

That the Japanese ship, the Honkan would leave Imieji at 1000 (I) April 10 and was expected to arrive at Makin at 0530 (I) the next day was learned from a Japanese dispatch of April 7. Sending²⁵

-
- 22 - IV, Case 5, C-5 - C-6.
 - 23 - IV, Case 5, D-1.
 - 24 - IV, Case 5, C-7.
 - 25 - IV, Case 6, A-1 - A-3.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

this information to the U.S.S. Pollack, ComSubPac added that no escort would be encountered although the ship might have air coverage.²⁶

It is not known whether or not the Pollack conducted a search since the submarine action report for these days was included in a secret letter.²⁷ Therefore, it must be assumed that this ComSubPac Ultra target was not sighted.

This ComSubPac dispatch also informed the U.S.S. Tunny and U.S.S. Pike that the carrier seen at Saipan might join the convoy headed for Truk where the Tunny later attacked it (see IV, Case 5 above).

April 9, 1945

Case 7

One unidentified warship accompanied by a destroyer was scheduled to leave Truk on April 8 and arrive at Kure on April 15, according to an intercepted Japanese dispatch of April 8.²⁸ Another dispatch revealed that an unidentified ship would pass north through waters near Kure on April 9-11.²⁹ Furthermore, an army ship had departed a location tentatively identified as

-
- 26 - IV, Case 6, B-1.
 - 27 - IV, Case 6, C-1 - C-2.
 - 28 - IV, Case 7, A-1 - A-2.
 - 29 - IV, Case 7, A-3.

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10 December 1945

Palau en route to Rabaul and would arrive at Truk at noon on April 12.³⁰

On April 9 ComSubPac in serial 64 asked the U.S.S. Pompano to watch both for the warships due at Kure on April 15 and for the unidentified ship scheduled to pass through 29-26 N, 140-35 E at 0300 (GCT) April 9 and 32-34 N, 139-30 E April 10.³¹ The Pompano from April 10 to 15 while patrolling on the routes to Yokosuka, somewhat to the east of Kure, sighted neither the warship nor the unidentified vessel.³²

ComSubPac serial 64 also directed the U.S.S. Pike to watch for the army ship passing through 6-20 N, 149-55 E at 0300 (GCT) April 10 and due at Truk twenty-four hours later.³³ The Pike set its course for Truk in accordance with this order; but on April 11, after reaching the area, the submarine received another dispatch, serial 70, which it followed in place of serial 64.

On April 12 the Pike sighted and attacked an enemy convoy in position 5-30 N, 150-42 E. The convoy escaped. On April 13 and 14 the submarine pursued a convoy consisting of two large marus, one small maru and

-
- 30 - IV, Case 7, A-1.
 - 31 - IV, Case 7, B-1.
 - 32 - IV, Case 7, C-1 - C-2.
 - 33 - IV, Case 7, E-1.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

one escort. Four torpedoes were fired, and it was believed that at least three hits were made.

The submarine was credited with damage to two unidentified freighters. Whether or not these were contacts with another Ultra target is unknown, since serial 70 is not available.³⁴

April 10, 1943

Case 8

According to a dispatch from the Fourth Base Force in the Truk area, a Japanese ship would arrive at the North Channel at 1300 (I) April 11.³⁵ Eleven hours later ComSubPac transmitted this information to the U.S.S. Tunny.³⁶

The Tunny, while patrolling off the North Channel, did not sight this ship. However, it sighted several patrol boats, and at 0345 (GCT) it sighted a Japanese submarine which it attacked with three torpedoes.³⁷ The enemy submarine maneuvered to avoid the missiles. The Tunny immediately dove, heard two torpedoes pass astern, and thereafter received attacks from a bomber and a destroyer. The Japanese at Truk, now thoroughly aroused

34 - IV, Case 7, C-3.
35 - IV, Case 8, A-1.
36 - IV, Case 8, B-1.
37 - IV, Case 8, C-2.

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10 December 1945

by the presence of the Tunny, which had successfully attacked an important convoy of carriers off the South Channel two days before (see IV, Case 5), made every effort to destroy the submarine. Their messages, intercepted by Communications Intelligence, led ComSubPac to send an Ultra dispatch to the Tunny on April 12 advising the submarine to leave the Truk area.

April 11, 1943

Case 9

A report that a convoy designated "B" would sail from Singapore to Sasebo, departing at 1400 (I) April 10 and arriving at 1100 (I) April 19, was sent by an unidentified Japanese originator on April 9. Noon positions for the convoy were listed for April 11 through 19.

On April 11 ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Sumner that the convoy would be in position 22 N-123 E at 0300 (GCT) on April 16. On the following day it would be in position 25 N 127 E at the same time. Also the Stingray was asked to note the course of the convoy and to try to intercept it at 33-40 N, 129-49 E at 0300 (GCT) on

38 - IV, Case 8, C-2 - C-7.
39 - IV, Case 8, B-2.
40 - IV, Case 9, A-1.

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⁴¹
April 19,

Although on April 16 and 17 the U.S.S. Runner was patrolling in Bashi Channel, the area through which the convoy was scheduled to pass, no sighting was reported.⁴²

At 2324 (GCT) on April 18 the Stingray sighted a convoy consisting of four freighters and four escort vessels sailing north at 27-43 N, 126-24 E. Though this position is considerably to the southwest of the Ultra's position for 0300 (GCT) April 19, it is a possible contact.

The Stingray made no attack since it considered its main mission was to get to its own area and lay mines.⁴³

April 12, 1943

Case 10

The Number Four Base Force at Truk sent a movement report of the submarine I-16, which was departing Truk for Japan, and listed the known positions of this ship for April 11, 15, and 16.⁴⁴ ComSubPac sent this intelligence to the U.S.S. Stingray, U.S.S. Seavolt,

-
- 41 - IV, Case 9, B-1.
 - 42 - IV, Case 9, C-2.
 - 43 - IV, Case 9, C-4 - C-5.
 - 44 - IV, Case 10, A-1.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

45

and U.S.S. Pompano for their information. No contact with the enemy submarine, however, was reported by any of the three submarines. The Seawolf had sighted a⁴⁶ convoy on April 15 in the vicinity of Marcus Island. The Stingray, while in the area, reported plane, trawler⁴⁷ and convoy contacts. The Pompano, patrolling in the area the I-16 was to traverse on April 15 and 16, sighted⁴⁸ planes, patrols, and a convoy but no enemy submarine.

April 12, 1943

Case 11

The Yokosuka Naval Base ordered a convoy of two, or possibly three, ships to leave Saipan for Marcus Island, according to a deciphered dispatch of April 12, 1943. Noon positions were given for April⁴⁹ 13-16.

To the U.S.S. Seawolf ComSubPac sent the 0300 (GCT) positions of this convoy for April 14, 15 and 16, adding that the ships would arrive at Marcus Island at 2100 (GCT) on April 16.⁵⁰ Having arrived at the assigned position at 2249 (GCT) on April 13 the U.S.S. Seawolf, patrolling near Marcus Island, sighted at 0614

-
- 45 - IV, Case 10, B-1.
 - 46 - IV, Case 10, C-1 - C-2.
 - 47 - IV, Case 10, C-3 - C-4.
 - 48 - IV, Case 10, C-5 - C-6.
 - 49 - IV, Case 11, A-1.
 - 50 - IV, Case 11, B-1.

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(GCT) on April 15 one large freighter similar to the Husimi Maru and one small trawler-type escort. In the following attack on the freighter, three and possibly four, of the nine torpedoes fired were hits. Although two torpedoes were fired at the escort, both missed. Later two more torpedoes were fired at the freighter, one of which exploded at the base of its stack. The target was badly damaged. This may be assumed to be a positive contact with ComSubPac's Ultra target.⁵¹

April 15, 1945

Case 12

A movement report of what was believed to be a Japanese convoy was intercepted on April 5 by Communication Intelligence. The target was en route from Palau to Tokyo, where it would arrive on April 17.⁵²

Declaring the target to be either a convoy or one unidentified vessel, ComSubPac transmitted this information to all subs copying the NFM Fox Schedule. The operational dispatch listed the target's noon positions for April 13, 15, and 17. Additional information about a typhoon moving north from 7 N, 139 E was included in

51 - IV, Case 11, C-1 - C-3.

52 - IV, Case 12, A-1.

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53
this message.

Although not specifically addressed by ComSubPac, the U.S.S. Pompano, patrolling in the area off Tokyo, the target's destination, failed to sight any ships other than patrol boats from March 15 through 54 17. Apparently no United States submarine contacted this Ultra target.

Case 13

The schedule of the Chokai from April 12 to April 15 was intercepted by Communication Intelligence. This ship would leave Truk at 0530 (I) on April 13 en route to Rabaul where it was scheduled to arrive at 55 0415 (I) on April 15.

Identifying the Chokai as a Takao class cruiser, ComSubPac at 0930 (GCT) April 13 in serial 78 informed the U.S.S. Pike that the ship had left the south gate of Truk at 2300 (GCT) on April 12 and would arrive at position 04-15 S, 152 E at 2115 (GCT) on 56 April 14.

On April 12-14 the Pike was pursuing

53 - IV, Case 12, B-1 - A-2.
54 - IV, Case 12, C-1 - 2.
55 - IV, Case 13, A-1 - A-2.
56 - IV, Case 13, B-1.

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convoys south of Truk. Serial 78 giving the Ultra information about the Chokai was received, the patrol report of the Pike reads, but "in view of fact we are so near our mission of Serial 70, decided to maintain present plans, then attempt mission prescribed in Serial 57 78". The Chokai was due at Rabaul by 0415 (I) April 58 15, and the Pike made no contact with it.

April 14, 1943

Case 14

An unidentified number of Japanese marus, escorted by subchaser #31, were scheduled to sail between Truk and Palau from April 13 to 18, according to a Japanese dispatch which also listed the noon positions 59 of the convoy.

Transmitting this information to the U.S.S. Pike, ComSubPac in serial 80 gave the convoy's 60 noon positions for April 14 and 15. At 1400 (GCT) April 14, the Pike's log notes that ComSubPac message 80 was received, but that the distance involved would 61 make it impossible to execute the assigned mission.

-
- 57 - IV, Case 13, C-1 - C-2. ComSubPac Serial 70 is not available.
58 - IV, Case 13, A-1.
59 - IV, Case 14, A-1.
60 - IV, Case 14, B-1.
61 - IV, Case 14, C-2.

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April 15, 1943

Case 15

Moon positions for a Japanese ship which had sailed from Kure on April 14 en route to Truk were sent in ComSubPac Serial 81G (15-0125) to the U.S.S. Stingray for April 16 at 22-50 N, 136-35 E and for April 18 at 11-50 N, 143-55 E. At 0830 (GCT) on April 16, in position 28-15 N, 138-23.5 E, the Stingray sighted a convoy of four ships. The submarine had no contact with the Ultra target.

To the U.S.S. Permit, ComSubPac in a second dispatch (Serial 82 at 15-0151) listed the positions of the same vessel for April 18 and 20.

Although the Permit reported complete radio reception, it is to be noted that the last consecutive serial received was 81; therefore, apparently the submarine did not receive the information concerning the Ultra target (Serial 82). No ship contacts were reported from April 18 through April 21.

Case 15

To the U.S.S. Permit ComSubPac sent an

-
- 62 - IV, Case 15, A-1 - B-1.
 - 63 - IV, Case 15, C-2.
 - 64 - IV, Case 15, B-2.
 - 65 - IV, Case 15, C-3.
 - 66 - IV, Case 15, C-4.

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operational dispatch on April 15 containing the information that two auxiliary carriers escorted by two destroyers would leave the north channel at Truk at 2245 (GCT) on April 15 on course ⁶⁷ 320.

Entering the 200 mile circle of Truk late on April 15, the Permit set its course for a line between Truk and Saipan. At 2100 (GCT) on April 16 a destroyer was sighted, and one hour and forty-five minutes later, another destroyer and a convoy of two good looking freighters² were seen in position 13-15 N, 147-12 E sailing on a direct course for Saipan. No attack was made since the convoy would reach port before the Permit could get in position to attack.

The convoy of two auxiliary carriers and two destroyers had left Truk about twenty-four hours before. A speed of some twenty knots would have brought them to the position in which the Permit made the sighting. However, the submarine reported their speed as only 9 to 10 knots and did not recognize the ships as auxiliary carriers but only as "good looking freighters".

The radio report of the Permit stated

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that Serial 81 was the last one received. ComSubPac's 151422 was Serial 83. This, therefore, can be considered⁶⁸ only a possible contact with the Ultra target.

Case 17

Scheduled to arrive at Takao at 0700 (I) on April 19, a group of ships designated as the "C" convoy would depart Sama at an unrecovered time. However, noon positions for April 15 through 21 were given in⁶⁹ this convoy report.

ComSubPac relayed to the U.S.S. Runner this information and specified the positions of the target⁷⁰ for April 16, 17, and 18.

Although radio reception was satisfactory and the Runner received ComSubPac's message, no action was taken by this submarine on this intelligence since it was several degrees north and east of these positions searching for another Ultra target previously reported⁷¹ by ComSubPac.

April 16, 1943

Case 18

From a Japanese ship report Communication

-
- 68 - IV, Case 16, C-1 - C-2.
 - 69 - IV, Case 17, A-1.
 - 70 - IV, Case 17, B-1.
 - 71 - IV, Case 17, C-2.

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Intelligence learned that the #20 Yama Maru en route from Iosop to Meyeron would arrive at its destination at 1600 on April 17.⁷² In a dispatch sent to the U.S.S. Pike, ComSubPac described the target as a 6,000 ton freighter and added its noon positions for April 15⁷³ and 16.

In spite of the fact that the Pike apparently searched the given areas, since at 0315 (GCT) on April 15 it reported its position as 3 N, 150-15 E,⁷⁴ it sighted nothing except enemy planes.

Case 19

On April 16 ComSubPac sent an Ultra dispatch to the U.S.S. Runner and the U.S.S. Seawolf, giving the noon positions for April 19 through 22 of an unidentified ship sailing from Singapore to Yokosuka. The noon positions were 18-52 N, 120-21 E for April 19; 21-33 N, 124-38 E April 20; 24-17 N, 130-12 E April 21;⁷⁵ and 28-45 N, 135-10 E April 22.

The Runner, during this time, was patrolling several degrees to the west, sighting small boats and a freighter which was attacked on April 21 in position

72 - IV, Case 18, A-1.
73 - IV, Case 18, B-1.
74 - IV, Case 18, C-2.
75 - IV, Case 19, A-1 - B-1.

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20-45 N, 113-09 E. ⁷⁶ No contact was made with this target by the Seawolf as that submarine was successfully attacking ships to the east of the course of the Ultra target. ⁷⁷

April 22, 1943

Case 20

An intercepted dispatch of April 14 outlined the complete schedule of a convoy sailing from the Empire to Truk. ⁷⁸

On April 22 ComSubPac, warning the U.S.S. Pike and the U.S.S. Permit to watch out for each other, sent them noon positions of the convoy for April 22, 23 and 24. ⁷⁹ In an additional dispatch of April 22, ComSubPac sent the convoy's position for 0300 (GCT) April 24 as well as its location thirteen hours later. ⁸⁰

Patrolling along the Truk-Empire route on April 22, 23 and 24, the Permit was en route to the area of Murilo Island just north of Truk. The Ultra target was not sighted. ⁸¹

According to the action report of the U.S.S. Pike, the operational dispatch was received and the submarine's course changed at 1200 (GCT) on April 22

-
- 76 - IV, Case 19, C-1 - C-3.
 - 77 - IV, Case 19, C-4 - C-6.
 - 78 - IV, Case 20, A-1.
 - 79 - IV, Case 20, B-1.
 - 80 - IV, Case 20, B-2.
 - 81 - IV, Case 20, C-2.

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to execute this mission. At 4-20 H, 152-02 E, on April 23 the Pika sighted an unidentified enemy vessel, which attacked, forcing the submarine to dive. When ComSubPac Serial 5, containing the additional information about the convoy, was received, the Pika was too far from Truk⁸² to execute this mission.

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APPENDIX IV

Intelligence, Operational Dispatches, Submarine
Action Reports and Verifications - April, 1943.

Case 1

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Chief of Staff 01/1141 April
Yokosuka Naval
District)
TO:
INFO: (4th Fleet)
(8th Fleet)
(Surface Escort
Unit #2)
(Kisaratsu Air
Station)

#1 departed NAA (Yokosuka) for RR.
(RABAU) VIA PS (Saipan) and PT (Truk).
Escort as far as PS by blank number Subchaser.
Moon posits from the 2nd through 7th all north
& east.

April 2nd - THIRTECOGS -50N. 139-00E. (31-50N?)
April 3rd - 28-40 N, 139-00 E.
April 4th - 25-30 N, 139-00 E.
April 5th - 22-15 N, 139-00 E.
April 6th - 19-50 N, 141-00 E.
April 7th - 17-30 N, 143-30 E.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSOPAC 01/2010 April
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: ---
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

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Case 1, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA FOR POMPAÑO X JAP MOVING DOWN LINE 139
DEGREES EAST WILL ARRIVE AT LATITUDE 28 DEGREES
40 MINUTES NORTH BY 0300 Z/GCT APRIL 3RD X

IF POSSIBLE PROCEED TO LONGITUDE AND INTERCEPT X
IF YOU GET HIM PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL AT ABOVE
POINT PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO LONGITUDE 138 EAST
AND AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS TONIGHT X

THIS IS COMSUBPAC SERIAL 48 X RED PORPOISE

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Pompano

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: NFM surface reception was good
except for Subpac Serials 48 and 62
of April which were missed.

Case 2

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (In Marshalls 31/2000 March
Area) (C)
TO: (Base Force
4) (B)
INFO: (4th Fleet) (B)
(Base Force 5,
Saipan) (B)
(Civil Engineers
Section 4, Naval (B) or
Civil Engineers at Truk (B))

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Case 2, No. A-1 (Cont.)

((Yokosuka Defense
Force))(B)
((Has a CoFS or
Yokosuka Defense Force))(B)

ship loaded with 3000 tons of _____ and
600 tons of _____ will depart Yokosuka at 1300/
April 2nd for Truk. Noon positions follow:

April 3rd - 31-28 N, 138 E.
April 4th - 26-46 N, 138 E.
5th - 22-04 N, 138 E.
6th - 17-23 N, 138 E.
7th - 14-05 N, 138-13 E.
8th - 11-06 N, 144-____ E.
9th - 8-25 N, 148-26 E.

Course 126, speed 14. (Remainder unreadable but
apparently gives course changes and requests
rendezvous).

No. A-2

FROM:

31/2000 March

TO:

INFO:

((Base Force #4)
((Base Force #5,
Saipan)
((Yokosuka Naval
District Chief of Staff)
((Yokosuka Defense Force).

Blank carrying 3000 tons _____ and 600 workmen
will depart Yokosuka for PT (Truk) at 1300 on
2nd April.

Noon positions (all north and east).

April 3 31-28 N, 138-00 E.
April 4 26-46 N, 138-00 E.
April 5 22-04 N, 138-00 E.
April 6 17-23 N, 138-00 E.
April 7 14-05 N, 141-13 E.
April 8 11-06 N, 144-45 E.
April 9 08-25 N, 148-26 E.

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Case 2, No. A-2 (Cont.)

Course 126, speed 11.5 knots. Proceed to 2 miles north of --Pulappulap Island?). Change course to 102° and proceed to west channel arriving Truk at 0800 on 10th April. At 1000/9th April, at 08-38 N., 148-08 E, rendezvous with escort vessel.

No. A-3

FROM: (Maru) (B) 31/1200 March
TO: (Soerabaya) (B)
(6th Base
Force) (B)

INFO: (4th Fleet) (B)
(Combined Fleet) (C)

0200 depart Taroa. Expect to arrive Truk afternoon of the 6th.

Moore Positions:

2nd - 05-33 N, -03 E.
3rd - 03-41 (42) N, 161-40 E.
4th - 03-25 N, 159- E.
5th - 04-39 N, 156-06 E.
6th - 06-34 N, 152-28 E.
Will require 350 tons of fuel.

No. A-4

FROM: (Maru) 31/1200 March
TO: Unknown Action
addressee

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Case 2, No. A-4 (Cont.)

Scheduled to depart Taroa at 0200
April 1st, and arrive Truk the afternoon of
April 6th.

Neon Posits follows:

2nd - 05-33 N, 160-43 E.
3rd - 03-41 N, 161-40 E.
4th - 03-06 N, 159-00 E.
5th - 04-39 N, 150-66 E.
6th - 06-34 N, 152-28 E.

No. A-5

FROM:

TO:

(Combined Fleet)
(4th Fleet)

28/1010 March

INFO:

(Base Force #4)
(Base Force #8)

((1st Section,
Naval General Staff))

Blanks.

1. Depart 27th, pass through:

Point "A" (26 N, 135 E)
Point "B" (22 N, 132 E)
Point "C" (18? , 133 E)

and arrived 1500/5th. Maru for RR
(Rabaul) others for _____.

Speed 9

2. Neon positions: (29th through 5th)

29th, 28-35 N, 133-50 E.
30th, 25- E, 134-40 E.
31st, 227- N, 132 E.
1st, 20 N, 132-10 E.
2nd, 16- N, 132-30 E.
3rd, 13-30 N, 132- E.
4th, -12 N, 132-55 E.

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Case 2, No. A-5 (Cont.)

Nota: 4th, 10-20 N, 132-55 E.
Arrive PP (Palao) _____ ?

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

02/0332 March

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

UNDERWATER DOPESTER SERIAL 49 FROM COMSUBPAC X
BLUE PORPOISE X CANCEL MY 010911 WHICH WAS
SERIAL 46 X OUR JEEP WENT SOUR AND MESSAGE IS
GARBLED X

PC 588 WILL MEET SUNFISH AT 21-20 NORTH 159 WEST
AT 1600 GCT 3RD X NOTE TIME AND POSITION X
SALMON NOW ENROUTE PEARL FROM FRISCO X

FOLLOWING IS ULTRA FOR POMFANO X 1 MAPLE (TYPE
UNKNOWN) PROBABLY OF SOME IMPORTANCE AND 1 LEMON
(ESCORT VESSEL) HEADING FOR SAIPAN AT 3 HOURS GCT
2ND ENSX 5000 (31-50 NORTH 139-00 EAST) ALGAROA
CLSK 4000 (28-40 NORTH 139-00 EAST) VGSX 3000
(25-30 NORTH 139-00 EAST) X

ANOTHER MAPLE MAYBE WITHOUT LEMON ENROUTE TRUK
AND CARRYING 600 HIPS AT 3 HOURS GCT 3RD ENCL
2600 (31-28 NORTH 138-00 EAST) ALGAROA JREL 4600
(26-46 NORTH 138-00 EAST) DREL 0400 (22-04 NORTH
138-00 EAST) X

ORIGINAL

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Case 2, No. B-1 (Cont.)

IF YOU GET EITHER OR BOTH LET US KNOW OTHERWISE
WILL GIVE ADDITIONAL DOPE ON THEM TO SCOTTY AT
TRUK X

FOR TUNNY IF NOT OTHERWISE ENGAGED 1 MAPLE
(TYPE UNKNOWN) AT 3 HOURS GCT 5TH VFGK 3906
(4-39 NORTH 156-06 EAST) ALGAROA BWLQ 3428
(6-34 NORTH 152-28 EAST) X

FOR HADDOCK ONE MAPLE MAKING 9 KNOTS HEADED
FOR PALAO WILL PASS THROUGH GFBJ 2055 (10-20
NORTH 132-55 EAST) AT 3 HOURS GCT 4 APRIL

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pompano

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio reception: See IV, Case 1, C-1.

No. C-2

April 2

- Enroute to patrol station off NOJIMA SAKI.
- 1005 (I) 34-53 N, 140-17 E, sighted 4 recon-
naissance planes.
 - 1033 (I) Same position, sighted 1 observation plane.
 - 1500 (I) First decent cut put us 2-1/2 mi. S. of
shoal spot off KATSUURA LIGHT. Due
strong onshore set had to use 2/3 speed
to clear to E.
 - 1602 (I) 35-04 N, 140-28 E, sighted medium bomber.
 - 1910 (I) Saw searchlights on land in direction
of KATSUURA WAN. On numerous future
occasions saw searchlights between
NOJIMA SAKI and KATSUURA WAN, some of
these are probably in the vicinity of
the TATEYAMA Airfield.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 3

Patrolled Truk lanes to E. of MIYAKE
SHIMA. Radar position could at least
be kept here on MIYAKE and MIKURA SHIMA.
0910 (I) Heard distant underwater explosions.

U.S.S. Tunny

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Radio reception during this patrol
was satisfactory.

Comsubpac serial number forty-
eight missed.
Last serial received, 5.
Last serial sent 211450.

No. C-4

April 6

Conducted surface and submerged patrol
north of Mogami Bank.

April 7

Conducted surface patrol west of
McLaughlin Bank. At -

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-4 (Cont.)

April 7 (Cont.)

- 2234 (K) made radar contact range 13,000 yards. (Contact #7 & 8). Tracked target and escort on zigzag course at speed of nine knots. Crossed astern to gain advantage of dark background and closed target at 20 knots on the starboard flank. While closing in the range on the target from about 3500 to 2500 yards, we passed through a rain squall of very fine rain drops (considerably more than a mist). This squall lasted for about four minutes during which time the antenna of the SJ radar was glowing with St. Elmo's fire or similar phenomenon. The SJ radar was in use and the SD was secured with mast lowered, yet both SD radiator tips were glowing in the same manner. As soon as the rain stopped this effect stopped. Target identified as AP similar to Buenos Aires Maru, escort destroyer of HIBIKI Class was patrolling ahead. At range of 1200 yards escort challenged - missed a wonderful chance to sink him at this time as the forward room was having trouble opening the outer doors at the high speed. My kingdom for some hydraulic doors.
- 2353 (K) At range of 960 yards fired two torpedoes at AP (would have fired another had it been ready). (Attack #3). One hit amidships, one aft. Submerged to 300 feet and rigged for depth charge attack which followed immediately and continued until destroyer lost contact in heavy rain.

No. C-5

Number:
Date and Time:
Position:
Description:
Remarks:

7
2234 - April 7
8° - 50' N - 147° - 06' E
Buenos Aires Maru (AP)
Damaged by two hits -
amidships and aft.
Probably sunk, Attack #3

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-5 (Cont.)

Number: 8
Date and Time: 2234 - April 7
Position: 8°-50' N - 147°-06' E
Description: Hibiki Class Destroyer
Remarks: Not too good

U.S.S. Haddock

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: All consecutive serials were
received except one -- Comsubpac
serial 48.

No. C-7

April 4

Sent despatch concerning damage to
conning tower and that we had left
area to return to port.

Case 3

A -- Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

30/2350 March

INFO:

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 3. No. A-1 (Cont.)

Very sketchy but appears to give noon positions
on 4th and 5th as: 33-25 N, 123-15 E.
35-32 N, 122-00 E.,
respectively.

Speed 7½ knots. No escort.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX

03/1815 April

INFO: - - -

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS GOES ULTRA TO MUSH MORTON X 1 MAPLE (TYPE
UNKNOWN) NO LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X COURSE
BLANK X SPEED MINUS 2.5 (7.5 KNOTS) X TIME
MINUS 900 (0300) X DATE MINUS 11 (4TH) X ZT
AL 2515 (33-25 NORTH 123-15 EAST) ALGARCEA BP
NC 3200 (35-32 NORTH 122-00 EAST) COMSUEPAC
SERIAL 53

C-Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Wahoo

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was good and
complete.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945.

Case 3 (Cont.)

No. C-2

April 2

0910 (K) Sighted sail on the horizon. After closing it a bit we could see a single sail and a long hull. Believed this to be a patrol disguising himself or economizing on fuel. We were several hundred miles east of the Bonins and no sail boat had any business in these parts. Position latitude 31-30 N, Longitude 150-25 E.

No report given for April 3-5.

April 6

1030 (Y) Arrived U.S. Submarine Base,
MIDWAY ISLAND.

Case 4

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (43rd Guard
Division)

01/1021 April

TO:

INFO:

(CofS Kurs)
(Nav. Gen. Staff
1st Sect.)
(Combined Fleet)
(Combined Fleet)

Palau Guard Force Despatch Operation Order #57.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 4, No. A-1 (Cont.).

1. Convoy T2 (____ San Maru, ____ Go Maru, ____ Maru, Nan ____ Maru, Ko Maru) at 1200, 3rd April position blank degrees 30 minutes north, 132-40 east (course 175 degrees, speed 9 knots) and convoy K2 (blanks) at 0600 4th April, position 10-47 north, 132-56 East (course 154 degrees, speed 8 knots).

2. Blank 0600, 2nd April and blank 0600, 3rd April depart and rendezvous with convoys T2 and K2 at the above positions and escort them back to Palau.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PRES: PRIORITY

04/0600 April

SERIAL 54 X HURLINGAME DEPARTED PEARL FOR SOWESPAC GOING VIA JOHNSTON X SEAWOLF DEPARTED FOR AREAS 118 AND C VIA MIDWAY X SUNFISH ARRIVED PEARL X PC 587 WILL MEET POGY IN POSITION REQUESTED AT 16 HOURS OCT 5TH X

WALES WHO WAS POGY SKIPPER HAS RECOVERED FROM PNEUMONIA AND IS FLYING FROM BALECA TO PEARL TO REJOIN SHIP X LATEST ADDITION TO TURBY COMPLEMENT UNABLE TO QUALIFY IN SUBMARINES X

ITS A DAUGHTER BORN ABOUT APRIL 1ST TO LIEUT QUINN X MOTHER REPORTS ALL WELL AND HEALTH RESTORED X REST OF MESSAGE IS ULTRA X

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 4, No. B-1 (Cont.)

FOR HADDOCK X PECAN X BLANK (COURSE) X
MINUS 2 (SPEED 8 KNOTS) X PLUS 9 (TIME 2100
GCT) X MINUS 12 (DATE 3 APRIL X GFEJ 4756
(10-47 NORTH 132-56 EAST) HEADING FOR THE
RAMPARTS YOU WATCH

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio reception: See IV, Case 2, C-6.

No. C-2

See IV, Case 2, C-7.

Case 5

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: No originator
TO: (TOMO 8)
(Combined Fleet) (B)
INFO: (TOMO 1)
(ROSA 4)
(Air Arsenal 105,
Truk) (B)
(TETI 8)
(HOKO 1)
(NRA 3)
(Saipan Military
Stores) (B)
(Bureau Aeronautics) (B)
(Military Stores
Section, Truk) (B)
(Harbor Affairs
Section 4, Truk) (C)

03/1041 April

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 5, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Intelligible sections follows).

Convoy of possibly 6 vessels including Takatori Maru possible air tender
Pass 100 Miles west of Chichijima and on 8th April miles south of
At 0000/April 10 in position 101 miles, bearing 220 degrees from West Channel of Truk. Arrives South Channel at 0545 same day.
Will stop at Saipan between 1200 and 1600/April 7 for topping off fuel.

HYPO COMMENT: Cargo includes aircraft listed by types. Continuing work on this one.

No. A-2

FROM: Unknown Originator. 03/1041 April
TO: (Combined Fleet)
INFO: (105th Air Arsenal, Truk)

(4th Fleet)
(4th Naval Munitions Sect., Truk)
(garbled)

(garbled)

From Commanding Officer Otaka

1. Otaka

DD in DesDiv 15), DD in DesDiv 15), Hibiki, and Sazanami depart Yokosuka 1000 the 4th and arrive Pt (Truk) 0630 on the 10th.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5, No. A-2 (Cont.)

General Route is as follows:

Pass _____ North of Okinoyama and proceed via
(near Yokosuka) to a point 10 miles West
of _____ On the 5th, 100 miles due West of
Chichijima, on the 8th about 200 miles Southwest
of _____ place, 14 hours from Saipan), on the
10th at 0000, 220°, 104 miles from PT (Truk) West
Channel, at 0545 pass through South Channel.
Average speed 16 knots.

2. On the 7th from 1200 to 1600 Hibiki
and Sazanami _____ will each take _____ tons of
crude oil at PS (Saipan).

3. Cargo and personnel as follows:

1. Otaka

(A) Naval Type Zero _____ for 4 Model
11 reconnaissance seaplanes.
2 Model 11 type Zero float fighters,
1 Model 1 type Zero reconnaissance
seaplane.
50 propellers? for Zero Fighters.

NSS COMMENT:

This
diversion from a normal course from Saipan to
Truk would increase the distance to be covered,
sufficiently to allow them to arrive Truk at the
scheduled time.

Refer NSS's 052303. This is retranslation of
Paragraph 3.

3. Cargo and Passengers are as follows:

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5, No. A-2 (Cont.)

1. Otaka

(A) Navy _____ for 4 type Zero Model 11 reconnaissance seaplanes.
2 type Zero Model 11 float fighters.
1 type Zero Model 1 reconnaissance seaplane.
50 belly ? tanks for Zero fighters.
7 _____ and 1 of the same
in addition about three tons of _____.

(B) Army-54 Type-3 fighters and 2 type 99 heavy bombers? for the 68th Squadron and aviation fuel _____. In addition 70 tons of _____.

(C) Passengers - Navy 3 Warrant and above, 20 ratings.
Army 87_49_ and #_enlisted men.

2

(A) Navy-23 shipboard fighters, 5 shipboard bombers and 11 Zero belly? tanks.

(B) Army-18 heavy bombers, 5 command reconnaissance planes type 100 and _____ pieces of additional stores.

(C) Passengers-Navy 12 Warrant and above, _____ ratings.
Army-2 Warrant and above, 7 enlisted.

WSS COMMENT: This part 2 of 031041, 26432. Paragraph 3 Sub Paragraph (A) is a retranslation. From the fact that only the Otaka _____ and _____ were carrying aircraft it may be deduced that _____ previously identified as possible XCV, may be some other type of vessel.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 5 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM: (In Marshalls 31/2000 March
Area) (C)
TO: (Base Force
4) (B)
INFO: (4th Fleet) (B)
(Base Force 5,
Saipan) (B)
(Civil Engineers
Section 4, Naval (B), or
Civil Engineers at Truk) (B)
(Yokosuka Defense
Force) (B)
(Has a CofS or Yokosuka
Defense Force) (B)

ship loaded with 3000 tons of _____ and 600
tons of _____ will depart Yokosuka at 1300/April
2nd for Truk.

Noon positions follows:

April 3rd - 31-28 N., 138 E.
4th - 26-46 N., 138 E.
5th - 22-04 N., 138 E.
6th - 17-23 N., 138 E.
7th - 14-03 N., 138-13 E.
8th - 11-06 N., 144- E.
9th - 8-25 N., 148-26 E.

Course 126, speed 14½ knots. (Remainder un-
readable but apparently gives course changes and
requests rendezvous).

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUSPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPIING NPM
FOX
INFO: - - -

05/0500 April

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5, No. B-1 (Cont.)

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ALL TIMES GCT IN THIS ULTRA FROM COMSUBPAC
SERIAL 55 X HADDOCK IN POSIT LUEL (11DEG NORTH
138 DEG EAST) AT 12 HOURS 4TH HEADING FOR MIDWAY
YOU MAY CUT THROUGH AREA 14 IF YOU DESIRE AS
THAT AREA NOW VACANT X IF YOUR CONDITION PERMITS
OPORD APRIL 7TH PATROLLING SAIPAN X EXPECT 1
SEAPLANE TENDER AND 5 TYPE UNKNOWN ENROUTE EMPIRE
TO TRUK WILL STOP AT SAIPAN FROM THREE HOURS TO
SEVEN HOURS ON 7TH FOR FUEL X

TURKEY NOTE THIS PECAN IS EXPECTED TO BE 101 MILES
BEARING 220 FROM WEST CHANNEL TRUK AT 15 HOURS 9
APRIL AND PIKE WILL NOT ENTER AREA 15 SOUTH AT
EASTERN EDGE UNTIL AFTER DAWN ON 10 APRIL X TURKEY
DISREGARD MY SERIAL 44 CONCERNING LOADED TANKER X
BELIEVE HADDOCK SUNK SHIP CONCERNED NORTH OF PALAO
ON 3RD X SHIP EVIDENTLY NOT TANKER BUT 087
POPCORN X NICE GOING DAVENPORT SHES A BEAUTY X

TOUGH LUCK SCOTTY BUT HERE IS ANOTHER 1 TYPE
UNKNOWN CARRYING 600 NIPS AT 3 HOURS 7TH FLWG 0513
(14-05 NORTH 141-13 EAST) ALGAROA LUYA 0045 (11-
06 NORTH 144-45 EAST) TSUH 2526 (8-25 NORTH 148-
26 EAST) THENCE TO POINT 2 MILES NORTH OF PULAP
AND THEN COURSE 102 TO WEST CHANNEL TRUK ARRIVING
23 HOURS 9TH X PROBABLY MEETS ESCORT VESSEL AT
ONE HOUR 9 APRIL AT TSUH 3808 (8-38 NORTH 148-08
EAST) X

PORPOISE ENROUTE JOHNSTON MAY SIGHT PIKE ENROUTE
TRUK WITHIN NEXT 48 HOURS X POLLACK REPORTS
SINKING SHIP OFF JALUIT YESTERDAY X NICE WORK
ROBY

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NFM
FOI
INFO: CINCPAC

07/0723 April

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5, No. B-2 (Cont.)

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 58 IS ULTRA X FOR TUNNY PECAN MENTIONED
IN MY SERIAL 55 SCHEDULED TO BE 101 MILES BEARING
220 DEGS FROM WEST ENTRANCE TRUK AT 15 HOURS GCT.
9TH IS MOST IMPORTANT X CONTAINS 2 AND POSSIBLY
3 OAKS (AUXILIARY CARRIERS) X PECAN WILL AVERAGE
16 KNOTS AND IS SCHEDULED ENTER SOUTH PASS TRUK
ABOUT 21 HOURS GCT 9TH X

PIKE IF POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO REACH THAT VICINITY
AT THAT TIME TO ASSIST IN PLANTING THESE OAKS
BUT BE SURE TO AVOID DETECTION ENROUTE AND
NOTE THAT "SOUTH PASS" MAY MEAN ANY PASS BETWEEN
OTTA AND ULIFAURO X

SORRY HADDOCK BUT BELIEVE ONLY 2 IRONWOODS
(DESTROYERS) RATHER THAN ENTIRE PECAN ENTERED
SAIPAN 7TH FOR FUEL X TRIGGER ARRIVED PEARL X
FINBACK PUT THE FINISHING TOUCHES ON SHIP WHICH
TUNNY FORCED INTO BEACHING HERSELF AT WAKE X

PERMIT DEPARTING MIDWAY FOR AREA 15 NORTH VIA
WAKE MAY SIGHT FINBACK WHO ARRIVES MIDWAY 9TH

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: All consecutive serials were
received except one -- Comsubpac
serial 48.

No. C-2

April 5

2057 (I) Received instructions to patrol off
SAIPAN on seventh if conditions
permitted. Set course for SAIPAN.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 6

0531 (K) Entered area.

April 7

0509 (K) Submerged patrol off SAIPAN.

0900 (K) With SAIPAN bearing 0930°T., distance 13 miles, sighted aircraft carrier with destroyer and plane escort bearing 030°T., range 12,000 yards, angle on bow 85° port. Came to normal approach course and attempted to close track at best speed. For a moment, when the carrier zigged 20 degrees to the left and the angle on the bow decreased to about 65 or 70, it looked as if we had a chance. However, it was soon evident that this was his furthestmost left zig and a short one at that.

0943 (K) With the range 20,000 yards, angle on the bow 160° port, estimated target speed 20 knots, reluctantly gave up the chase. A light haze and a bright low sun made the visibility toward the island very poor and prevented sighting the target earlier. The Executive Officer was the O.O.D. at the time and was making complete and thorough sweeps every five minutes.

Identified this carrier as similar to KAGA (sunk at Midway) but it may have been an auxiliary carrier as there appeared to be a catapult on the port side aft. Pictures were taken.

1155 (K) Observed two destroyers entering harbor from the north.

1243 (K) Observed mine layer and two destroyers patrolling off harbor for a distance of 5 miles. Many planes in the air at all times. (Bombers and small observation planes).

1726 (K) Observed two destroyers to leave harbor. Impossible to close for attack.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 7 (Cont.)

- 1909 (K) When ready to surface was close to harbor and caught between two patrol ships. With one vessel heading directly for us went deep until clear at
- 2048 (K) Surfaced, cleared the harbor at full speed.
- 2346 (K) Sent contact report of carrier movements.

April 8

- 0330 (K) Departed area for Midway.

April 13

- 1158 (L) Dove for thirty minutes upon sighting plane simultaneously by sight and radar at 10 miles. Lat. 24-16-45 N., Long. 167-48-30 E.
- 2230 (L) Sent message giving time of arrival off Midway.

No. C-3

Contact Reports

Time and Date:	0900 (K) - April 7
Lat. and Long:	15-12 $\frac{1}{2}$ N. - 145-31 E.
Type:	1 CV or CV3 - 1 DD
Initial Range:	12,000
Est. Speed:	20 knots
Est. Course:	285
Description and Remarks:	Aircraft carrier similar KAGA (sunk at Midway), possibly auxiliary carrier. Pictures taken. New destroyer escort, unable to close.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 5, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Time and Date: 1155 (K) - April 7
Lat. and Long: 15-11½ N. - 145-33½ E.
Type: 2 DD
Initial Range: 16,000
Est. Speed: - - -
Est. Course: - - -
Description and Remarks: New destroyers.
Entering SAIPAN.
Unable to close.

Time and Date: 1243 (K) - April 7
Lat. and Long: 15-11½ N. - 145-34½ E.
Type: 2 DD 1 CM
Initial Range: 16,000
Est. Speed: - - -
Est. Course: - - -
Description and Remarks: 2 new destroyers.
1 mine layer. Patrolling
off SAIPAN.

Time and Date: 1726 (K) - April 7
Lat. and Long: 15-13 N. - 145-35½ E.
Type: 2 DD
Initial Range: 14,000
Est. Speed: - - -
Est. Course: - - -
Description and Remarks: 2 new destroyers.
Leaving harbor, unable
to close. Left to south.

U.S.S. Tunny

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 2, C-3.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5 (Cont.)

No. C-5

April 8

- 0227 (K) Surfaced in downpour, continued patrol surface and submerged north of West Fayu Island. At -
1703 (K) sighted 200 ton trawler beating toward Truk. (Contact #9).
2100 (K) Set course for rendezvous with convoy, southwest of Truk.

April 9

- 0939 (K) Sighted seaplane at distance of 12 miles, not picked up by radar, no indication that plane may have seen us. Plane contact #6). Dove, continued submerged until -
1859 (K) surfaced and commenced patrolling vicinity.
2228 (K) Made radar contact with convoy bearing 285° T, ranges 14000 - 16000 yards. (Contact #10). Plotted course 060° T. speed 18 knots. Maneuvered on four engines for position ahead when at -
2237 (K) disposition changed course toward us to 085° T, 0° angle on the bow. Slowed to two-thirds speed and headed in. Flooded down to decks awash. Convoy was now visible and seen to be disposed as follows: One large ACV or CV on our starboard bow, two ACVs in column to port and two DDs, one on each bow of the formation. At this critical moment three small boats resembling Motor Torpedo Boats or Landing Barges were picked up 300 - 500 yards, one point on our port bow in perfect formation 50 yards apart. (Contact #11). Gave up the idea of swinging bow toward twin targets, came

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5, No. C-5 (Cont.)

April 9 (Cont.)

right instead to a 90° track and dove to 40 feet. Shifted TDC set up on leading ship in left-hand column to stern tubes; set bow tubes to 000° gyro ant at -

2248 (K) Fired four torpedoes from stern tubes at 880 yards, using radar ranges and bearings only. (Attack #4). A spread of 0° - 2° L - 4° L - 6° L was used because of the tendency for radar bearings to lag. Heard four hits nine seconds apart. Target ahead was slightly behind position due to their recent change of course to the right. The executive Officer was on the periscope trying to pick up their bearing when he noted signalling, giving a nice check bearing (347°) before firing. Fired six torpedoes from the bow tubes, gyro angle zero, longitudinal spread, initial range 650 yards. (Attack #5). First three hit. All hits were with torpex heads. Depth charges close aboard followed immediately after firing presumably from MTBs as DD escorts screws could be heard at a considerable distance. Turned right to convoy course after firing and went deep. The sound gear was so full of noise from all directions it was difficult to keep track of any screws. Two more depth charges very close as we passed 90 feet, another heavy explosion at some distance, unlike a depth charge but more like a magazine going up rocked the boat at 140 feet. Crackling and grinding noises were heard in all compartments as well as in the sound gear. Amid all this confusion the TUNNY slipped quietly away to the northward, extremely happy and barely conscious

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5. No. C-5 (Cont.)

April 9 (Cont.)

of the destroyers screws heard
milling around for a time overhead.

April 10

- 0027 (X) Lost contact with all screws, came to
periscope depth, made reload and at -
0132 (X) Surfaced. Got off message for PIKE
on second transmission. (First was
spoiled by Nip jamming). Set course
for own area, patrolling submerged
during the day across the western
approaches.

No. C-6

Contact Report

Number: 8
Date and Time: 2234 - April 7
Position: 8° - 50' N. - 147° - 06' E.
Description: Hibiki Class-Destroyer
Remarks: Not too good.

Number: 9
Date and Time: 1703 - April 8
Position: 8°-07' N. - 146°-58' E.
Description: Trawler - 200 Tons.
Remarks: - - -

Number: 10
Date and Time: 2228 - April 9
Position: 6°-06' N. - 150°-29' E.
Description: Convoy - Two DDs, Two ACVs, One ACV
Remarks: 4 Hits in one ACV, or CV.
Attack #4.
3 Hits in big ACV or CV
Attack #5.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5. No. C-6 (Cont.)

Number: 11
Date and Time: 2245 - April 9
Position: 6°-06' N. - 150°-29' E.
Description: Three MVBs or landing barges.
Remarks: Encountered in midst of
convoy formation close aboard
just prior to firing.

U.S.S. Pike

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-7

April 7

2400 (L) Received Comsubpac Serial 58.

April 8

1645 (L) Sighted enemy plane. Submerged -
Lat. 12-04 N., Long. 165-20 E.

1745 (L) Surfaced.

April 9

1200 (L) No. 2 periscope out of commission -
Broken tilting wire.

D - Verification

11/0947 April

FROM: No originator.

FROM: Captain of Otaka.

Is Otaka report of torpedo attack at 2155 on 9th

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 5, No. D-1 (Cont.)

in 05-55 North, 150-23 East.

1 Otaka was in company with Chuyo, Chokai, and four destroyers. Appears that one torpedo exploded about 100 meters off Otaka beam.

Case 6

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

07/0409 April

TO:

(Combined Fleet (C))

(Air

Unit in Gilberts (B))

(Base

Force 6 (B))

(Airflot 22)

(11th Air

Fleet (B))

(Air Group

803 (B))

(Air Group 952 Makin

Detachment (A))

(Specific at

Insiji (B))

This ship (Honkan) will depart Insiji at 1000, April 10 (via SE channel) and expect to arrive RYA (Makin) at 0530, 11th. Speed 17.5. Have no escort so request maximum air coverage.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 6 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM:

07/0740 April

TO:

{ Combined
Fleet
{ Base Force #6)
{ Air Flot 22)
{ 11th Air Fleet)
{ Air Group 802)
{ Makin Detachment
Air Group 952)
{ (Tui Maru)

This ship will depart FYI (Imeji) 1000 April 10th
(passing through southeast channel). Arrive
RYA (Makin) 0530 ? 11th. Speed 17.5 knots.
Without escort. Request suitable reconnaissance.

No. A-3

FROM:

07/0740 April

TO:

{ (Garbled)
{ 11th Air
Fleet)
{ Air unit in
Gilberts)
{ Base Force 6)
{ Air Group 803)

This ship will depart FYI (Imeji) at 1000 April
10th via SE channel and arrive RYA (Makin) 0530
April 11th. Speed 17.5 knots. Without escort.
Request appropriate air patrol.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 6(Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: - - -

08/0330 April

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 60 FROM COMSUBPAC IS ULTRA X INFORMATION GIVEN POLLACK IN MY SERIAL 59 IN ERROR X FOLLOWING IS CORRECT X. 1 TYPE UNKNOWN WHICH IS POSSIBLY LARGE FAST TANKER WITHOUT ESCORT VESSEL BUT PROBABLY AIR COVERAGE WILL DEPART SOUTH EAST CHANNEL JALUIT AT 1 HOUR GCT 10 APRIL AND EXPECTS ARRIVE MAKIN AT 2030 GCT SAME DATE X WE HOPE NOT X SPEED SOMEWHAT DOUBTFUL BUT LOOKS LIKE 17 AND ONE HALF KNOTS WHICH WOULD INDICATE INDIRECT ROUTE OR RADICAL ZIGZAGGING X

HADDOCK SIGHTED CARRIER LEAVING SAIPAN YESTERDAY WHICH IS PROBABLY JOINING PECAN MENTIONED BY SERIAL 58 X

TURNEY AND PIKE NOTE X FOLLOWING UTMOST SECRET FOR NAUTILUS ONLY X BROCKMAN ADVISE WHEN CONVENIENT IF YOU HAVE ANY RAIDER BUNKS INSTALLED X UNDER PRESENT PLAN ONLY SHORT TIME AVAILABLE FOR REPAIR AT PEARL X THEREFORE ADVANCE INFORMATION DESIRED IN ORDER EFFECT PREPARATIONS BY SURFACE FOR ANY REPAIRS YOU REQUIRE X HOPE THAT SILVERSIDES RETURNING TO PEARL SO YOUR ROUTE CLEAR OF ANY FRIENDLY SUBS EXCEPTING PORPOISE WHO ARRIVES JOHNSTON ISLAND FOR FUEL APRIL 11TH FROM TRUK AND THEN PROCEEDS PEARL AND POLLACK PROBABLY WORKING BETWEEN JALUIT AND MAKIN

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pollack

Sixth War Patrol

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 6 (Cont.)

No. C-1

Radio Reception: There was very poor radio reception during the entire time we were in the area. Last consecutive serial received 91.

No. C-2

April 9

1900 (M) Surfaced.

The narrative from the time until 0600 (M) 12 April is the subject of a secret letter.

Case 7

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Unident)
TO: _____

08/0730 April

INFO: (Kure Naval Station)

Two ships departed Truk the 8th to arrive KAB (Kure) _____ hours 15th.
Positions: 1930/13th 29-46 North, 134-12 East.
Course from here _____ degrees. Arrive _____ 0830/14th.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 7 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM:
TO:

08/0730 April

(Naval
Technical Bureau)

INFO:

(Cardle)

--unident man of war and --DD
departed PT (Truk on 8th April. Scheduled
arrive NAB (Kure) at 0700 on 15th. At 1930
on 13th in 29-46 North, 13 (blank)-12
East, thence on course 330(?). At 0830 on
14th arrive --place near Saeki).

No. A-3

FROM:
TO:

08/1702 April

(Combined Fleet)(B)
(11th

Air Fleet)(B)
(Yokosuka Naval
District, Cors)(B)
(Maizuru Nav.
Station Comdt.)(B)

INFO:

(Assoc Civ. Eng.
Section at Yokosuka)(C)

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 7. No. A-3 (Cont.)

Following noon posits given:

9th 29-26N, 140-(21 or 46) E.
10th 32-34N, 139-30E.
11th 0600 pass point N.
1000 arrive.

No. A-4

FROM:
TO:
INFO:

03/1707 April

(4th Fleet) (B)

(8th Fleet) (B)

(4th Base Force
Truk) (B)

*Army chartered vessel _____ Maru (bound for
Rabaul) departed _____ (probably Palao) at
1600/08 for Truk, speed 15. Will arrive West
Channel (?) noon the 12th. Will pass through
points F, M & P.

Noon positions:

9th 06-06 N, 135-40 E.
10th 06-20 N, 140-55 E.
11th 06-40 N, 146-14 E.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. E-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: - - -

09/0350 April

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 7, No. B-1 (Cont.)

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SALTWATER SAGE SENDS SERIAL 64 FROM COMBUPAC X
SALOON AND STEAMERD ARRIVED PEARL X PERMIT
PROCEEDING TO TRUK VIA WAKZ HADDOCK STAY CLEAR
OF TRACK TO NORTHEAST X

FORPOISE REPORTS SINKING BEACH (FREIGHTER) ON
4 APRIL X GUDONON RETURNED FREEMANTLE AFTER
SHORT PATROL OFF SURABAYA AND BALIKPAPAN HAVING
SUNK 35,000 TONS WHICH MAKES NICE FIRST PATROL
FOR BILL POST X

REMAINDER IS ALL ULTRA X ONE MAPLE (TYPE UN-
KNOWN) 3 HOURS OCT 9TH MEUL 2635 (29-26N 140-35E)
ALCAROBA CGSI 3430 (32-34N 139-30E) POMPADO NOTE
ALSO ONE HICKORY (MAN OF WAR) WHICH MAY BE A
COTTONWOOD (CRUISER) AT 1030 OCT 13 APRIL MEUP
4612 (29-46N 134-12E) ENROUTE KURE X

FOR PIRCS ONE ARMY SUPPLY SHIP MAKING 15 KNOTS
AT 3 HOURS OCT 10 APRIL MEUL 2055 (6-20N 149-55E)
ALCAROBA SEND (6-40N 146-11E) AND 24 HOURS LATER
ARRIVES TRUK PROBABLY USING WEST CHANNEL X

FORPOISE REPORTS THAT NIPS MAINTAIN OUTER PATROL
25 MILES OFFSHORE AT TRUK X PIRCS TURNED AND PERMIT
NOTE

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pompano

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 1, C-1.

No. C-2

April 10

Identified a CV, 2 CA or CL, and 2 to
4 DD.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 7. No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 10 (Cont.)

- 0300 (I) Conducted attack and believe got 2 hits on CV. No immediate anti-submarine measures. After formation lost, set course for Tokyo, transmitter trouble prevented getting contact report off prior to diving.
- 1830 (I) Surfaced and sent contact report, our 091815. Made magnetic feature inoperative on remaining torpedoes.
- 1935 (I) 35-17-24 N, 142-24-18 E, sighted ship at 7,000 yards. SJ contact at 5,000. Small fishing vessel or trawler so avoided.

April 11

- 35-05 N, 140-39 E, sighted red and green lights of plane on port beam -
- 0424 (I) Submerged.
- 1306 (I) 35-12 N, 140-48 E, sighted heavy bomber. During night ran along coast from NE of KATSUURA and O SHIMA using SJ radar to keep desired distance off during rain and overcast.

April 12

- Unable to maintain patrol east of O SHIMA in 3.5 knot current without excessive speed so set course up along coast again.
- 1035 (I) While at 50 feet to replace a blown out test plug in salt water piping breached up to 30 feet, 10 miles off shore. Took 5 minutes with negative full, flooding in, speed and course change to get back under in the heavy seas.
- 1331 (I) Heard three distant explosions - may have been volcanic since didn't sound like depth charges. During night ran close in off shore with SJ radar search and good visibility and saw what appeared to be auxiliary navigational

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 7, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 12 (Cont.)

lights, bluffs, light houses, objects on shore and many small boat lights but no worthwhile traffic.

April 13

1522 (I) 34-38 N, 140-06 E, sound heard light screws. Made an observation and saw trawler at about 2,500 yards.

U.S.S. Pike

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

April 10

0430 (L) Received Comsubpac Serial 64. Left assigned route and set course for point at maximum speed.

2200 (K) Entered area.

April 11

0530 (E) Submerged to 80 feet. Observation every 30 minutes.

Long swells prevented remaining at periscope depth.

1825 (K) Surfaced.

2230 (E) Received Comsubpac Serial 70 when 17 miles south of Truk. Changed course to Southwest, discarding information contained in Comsubpac Serial 64 in favor of Serial 70.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 7. No. C-3 (Cont.)

April 12

0620 (K) While surfaced, Lat. 5-30 N., Long 150-42 E sighted enemy convoy, one small tanker, two medium merchant ships and one escort. Dove to attack. First stern tubes at the tanker. Missed. Target apparently sighted torpedo tracks as it was observed to turn sharply to parallel them. Escort then placed itself between us and targets which soon disappeared over the horizon. All hands feel terrible. First chance we get we drop the ball.

April 13-14

2300 (K) Smoke contact, Lat. 2-10 N., Long. 143-00 E. Convoy believed to consist of two large marus, one small maru and one escort. Tracked until 0150 (K) and submerged to attack. Could not obtain favorable firing position. At 0230 (K) surfaced and tried again. At 0456 (K) submerged to attack. At 0511 (K) fired four torpedoes at largest maru and two at the other large one. Soundman and all hands in forward torpedo room heard four distinct torpedo explosions followed by a series of apparent internal explosions. CO in conning tower could discern only 3 torpedo hits, and believes two hits in first and one in second. Sound could hear only two sets of screws (one heavy and one light high speed after firing.)

DAMAGED: 1 freighter (unidentified class)
7000 tons
1 freighter (unidentified class)
5000 tons

TOTAL: 12,000 tons

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 8

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (4th Base Force, 10/1635 April
Truk)
TO: (Harbor
Affairs Section)
(Mina Maru)
(Truk Comm
Zone)
(In Truk Area)
(Truk-New Guinea
Area)
(CoFS 8th Area
Army)
(Truk Area)
(Air Group 21)
INFO: (Truk Harbor
Affairs Section)
(4th Fleet)

Expect arrival by North Channel 1300 April 11.
Course 147.

No. A-2

FROM: (Base 11/1500 April
Force #4)
TO: (Flagship Northern
Section Truk Surface
Force).
INFO: (Combined Fleet)

Caroline Area Defense Force Despatch Opord #83.

Patrol forces blanks are to seek out and destroy
the enemy submarine which made a torpedo attack
on I-16.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 8 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM: (Base Force #4) 11/1500 April
TO:
INFO: (Combined Fleet)

Carolines Area Defense Force Desopord #83.

Command of Patrol Unit will (blanks) suitable force and thoroughly search out and destroy the enemy sub which torpedoed (blanks).

No. A-4

FROM: (Comdr Northern Sect. Surface Force) 11/1825 April
TO: (Miura Maru?)
(4th Base Force Patrol Vessel)
(4th Base Force)
INFO: (Subchaser #31)
(Subchaser #11)
(Ebon Maru)

Truk Surface Force Patrol Unit Despatch Operation Order #77.

1. Mineslayer #3 is to get underway immediately and destroy the enemy submarine which appeared at _____ from the North Channel.

2. Assigned areas are as follows:

_____ from 270° of North Channel to 330°.

KOKU U Maru. 330° to 301°.

Mineslayer #3. 30° to 90°.

#1 Shonan Maru. Within an area of 30 miles.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 8 (Cont.)

No. A-5

FROM: (Base Force 11/1937 April
#4)
TO: (Northern Section Surface Force)
(Ebon Maru)
INFO: (4th Fleet)

Caroline Area Defense Force Signal Despatch
Opord. #14.

1. At 1300 today, an enemy sub approached to a position bearing 25 degrees distant 5 miles from the North Channel and made a torpedo attack on one of our submarines.
2. Judging from the new condition, the enemy seems to be planning some sort of operation against the Truk area.
3. All picket boats and (garbled) are to maintain particularly strict watch against aircraft and to take care in identifying friendly units.

No. A-6

FROM: (Base Force #4) 11/1937 April
TO: (Ebon Maru)
INFO:

Caroline Area Defense Force Signal Despatch
Opord. #14.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 8, No. A-6 (Cont.)

1. Today at 1300 an enemy submarine approached within five miles 25 degrees from the North Channel and made a torpedo attack on one of our submarines.

2. Taking all circumstances into consideration the enemy seems to blank against the Truk area. Transports, warships, picket boats and surface forces are particularly to bear in mind that a specially strict lookout should be kept.

No. A-7

FROM:
TO:
INFO:

12/0700 April

(4th Fleet)

(Very sketchy).

Inner South Seas Force Desperd 131.

5th Base Force will have 902 Air Group Detached Unit proceed as soon as possible to Apra and for about 10 days (several blanks apparently conveying idea of patrol to be carried out) maintain anti-submarine patrol from 150 to 210 degrees for a distance of 200 miles.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: TURNX
INFO: CINCPAC

10/1825 April

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 8, No. B-1 (Cont.)

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X ONE ARMY TRANSPORT ARRIVING NORTH
PASS TRUCK AT 4 HOURS OCT 11 APRIL ROUTE UNKNOWN

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING
NPM FOX
INFO: - - -

12/0215 April

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOLLOWING IS ULTRA FOR JOHNNY SCOTT TAKE YOUR
TUNNY AND HER FOUR GOOD ENGINES AND GET MOVING
AWAY X YOU THREW SALT IN THEIR WOUNDS AGAIN
LAST NIGHT AND THE NIPS ARE SENDING EVERYTHING
THEY OWN OUT AFTER YOU X

BELIEVE SEVERAL SLANT EYED ADMIRALS WILL HAVE
TO DO THE HONORABLE THING IF YOU GET HOME
SAFELY X PERMIT AND PIKE MAINTAIN YOUR
PATROLS ABOUT 200 MILES FROM THE HOT SEAT X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tunny

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 5, C-4.

No. C-2

April 10

0027 (K) Lost contact with all screws, came to
periscope depth, made reload and at-
0132 (K) Surfaced. Got off message for PIKE on
second transmission. (First was spoiled
by Nip jamming). Set course for own
area, patrolling submerged during the
day across the western approaches.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 11

- Approaching North Pass, Truk was forced to dive about 25 miles out at -
- 0325 (K) When a searchlight suddenly went on about 500 yards ahead-on the starboard bow. (Contact #12). Light was apparently carried by a small boat which was never sighted or picked up by the radar. No depth charges followed so continued on in at three knots submerged. Sighted various planes (Plane contact #7) and numerous sampans during the day, but no patrol boats, until about -
- 1200 (K) First two then five patrol boats left North Pass on various headings. (Contact #13). At -
- 1340 (K) another patrol boat was reported heading out but at -
- 1345 (K) after another look it turned out to be a submarine making 18 knots, and steering course 010 T. (Contact #14). Went to Battle Stations and at -
- 1356 (K) fired the three remaining forward torpedoes at HIJM submarine I-9, (Identified by large white I-9 on Conning Tower) at a range of 3200 yards, spread 0°-2°L and 2°R. (Attack #6). One minute and thirty seconds later saw target turn away and parallel track of torpedoes. Went deep and turned away and at -
- 1401 (K) sound tracked two torpedoes passing astern.
- 1402 (K) A plane dropped stick of three bombs along track of our torpedoes astern. Rigged for silent running when screws of two patrol boats were picked up to port. Maneuvered to pass astern of patrol boats and lost contact. At -
- 1903 (K) surfaced in bright moonlight and started battery charge.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 11 (Cont.)

- 2014 (K) Made radar contact on port beam, range 9500 yards. (Contact #15). Tracked target on course 350 T, speed 18 knots. At -
- 2019 (K) sighted target, obviously a Destroyer, angle on bow about 10° starboard. Swung around for a stern shot and dove to 44 feet. As soon as target could be picked up with #1 periscope started to 60 feet when at a range of 1350 yards the destroyer headed in, angle on bow zero and increased speed to something like 30 knots. Took nine depth charges fairly close en route to 300 feet and more silent running. Was trailed until about -
- 2300 (K) shook him with a quick reversal of course. Heard him pass fairly close twice more before we surfaced. At -
- 2356 (K) after the moon had set, surfaced and restarted charge. It was noted on surfacing the LMC speaker on bridge had been damaged by depth charge. Replaced with spare.

April 12

- Charge was interrupted again when at -
- 0023 (K) Destroyer was sighted astern signalling us with a blinker gun. (Contact #16). Went to four engines and 21 knots. DD did not close so slowed to three engines and restarted charge until at -
- 0154 (K) sighted sampan 500 yards abeam to port. (Contact #17). Again the charge was interrupted temporarily.
- 0233 (K) Changed course to the north and headed for the boncos. Patrolled submerged during the day north of East Faya Island.
- 2100 (K) Received Comsubpac Serial 72.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 9

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 09/1851 April
TO:
INFO:

Part 1. "B" Convoy (for Sasebo) will depart
Singapore at 1400/10th April via Nagasaki?
(to arrive Sasebo 1100, 19th April.

Moore positions: North and East:

11th, 5-106.
12th, 9-109.
13th, 12-111?
14th, 16-116.
15th, 20-119.
16th, 22-123?
17th, 25-127.
18th, blank-128.
19th, blank.

Part 2. Moore posit 19 April 33-40 N, 129-49 East.
1800 Blank date arrive Shimonoseki?
20 April noon arrive Kobe.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 16 11/0547 April
TO: ALL SUBMARINES
GUARDING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 9, No. B-1 (Cont.)

SERIAL 68 D X ULTRA X PECAN COURSE BLANK X
SPEED BLANK X TIME 0300 X DATE 16 X DNAL
(22 NORTH 123 EAST) ALGARORA VGMZ (25 NORTH
127 EAST) X RUNNER RENDER HONORS X OTUS EARLE
NOTE SAME PECAN COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X
TIME 0300 X DATE 19 X ZTOR 4049 (33-40 NORTH
129-49 EAST)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Runner

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio reception: Reception of submarine messages
was satisfactory since messages
were repeated.

No. C-2

April 16

2100 (H) Altered course for Bashk Channel (area
of convoy).

April 17

2345 (H) Patrolling, surface and submerged.
Sighted 3 flashing lights on horizon.
These were believed to be fishing or
patrol vessels and were sighted
occasionally throughout the night.

U.S.S. Stingray

Seventh War Patrol

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 9 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Reception was satisfactory.
All serials were received
with the exception of PETER.

No. C-4

April 18

0210 (Z) Entered area

April 19

0800 (I) While proceeding on the surface to the western part of the area, sighted two patrol vessels, bearing 340 R., Angle on bow approximately 75-80 Starboard, range approximately 10000 yards. Made quick dive, and came left to parallel, and then pass astern so as not to be sighted while proceeding to the area to lay mines.

0824 (I) Sighted convoy bearing 85 Relative, hull down, only masts and stacks visible, range approximately 14000 yards, angle on bow approximately 60 starboard. This convoy consisted of four freighters plus four escort vessels, but identification uncertain. From relative size of masts, it looked as if the escorts were arranged two ahead, one in the middle, and one aft of the freighters.

0833 (I) Came to normal approach course and tried to close at full speed. Convoy made zig to left giving angle on bow of about 100 starboard. As it was impossible to close the range enough to get off a good shot, maneuvered to get into position if he should zig back. It is considered that if I had immediately come to the normal approach course and proceeded at full speed to close, there would have been a good possibility of closing the range to approximately 3000 yards on the

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 9, No. C-4 (Cont.)

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 9, No. G-4 (Cont.)

April 19 (Cont.)

rear ship. I did not do so as the two escorts were the only ships sighted at first through the haze, and I considered my main mission was to get to my area and lay mines undetected. This is the second time I have had to watch a convoy pass by well outside shooting range. Contact was made both times with the escorts while proceeding on the surface.

No. G-5

Contact Report

Number:	3
Time and Date:	0824 (I) - April 19
Lat. and Long:	27-43 N. - 126-24 E.
Est. Course:	010°
Speed:	9.5 to 10 knots
Type:	Four freighters Four patrol vessels.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 10

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Base 11/0556 April
Force 4)(B)
TO: (Takasago Maru
in Base Force 4)(B)
(In Truk Area
February 23)(C)
(Harbor Affairs
Section 8)(C)
(#15 Shonan
Maru)(C)
(All Ships Saipan
Area February 6)(C)
(All Ships Truk
Area)(C)
INFO: (Air Group 902)(B)
(Harbor Affairs Section
4, Truk)(C)
(4th Fleet)

(Movement report of I-16 departing Truk for Japan).

Positions follows: Depart PT (Truk) at 1300/April 11th
1900 same day position 9 N,
152-54 E.
0000/April 15, posit 29-32 N,
146-59 E.
0000/April 16, position 32-50 N,
141-2 E.
0600 same day bearing 230 (or
240) degrees distant
15 miles from Nojinazaki.
0900 same day expect to arrive
Yokosuka.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 10 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: STINGRAY
SEAWOLF
POMFANO

12/0547 April

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X 1 SUBMARINE

(COURSE)	BLANK	BLANK	BLANK
(SPEED)	BLANK	BLANK	BLANK
(TIME)	1000	1500	2100
(DATE)	11th	14th	15th
(PCST)	9-00H	29-32N	34-46N
	152-54 E	146-59 E	139-38 E

SERIAL 732 X PCE INFO OTUS EARLE ROY CROSS AND
TOMMY THOMAS

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Seawolf

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 11, C-1.

No. C-2

See IV, Case 11, C-2

U.S.S. Stingray

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 10, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 9, C-3.

No. C-4

April 11

- 0728 (M) SD Radar contact on plane, distance five and one-half miles. Made quick dive. Position Lat. $29^{\circ}-47.5'N$; Long. $162^{\circ}-31'E$.
- 1115 (M) Sighted and made SD Radar contact on two engine bomber, type 98, distance six and one-half miles. Made quick dive. Position Lat. $29^{\circ}-48.5'N$; Long. $161^{\circ}-29'E$.

April 12

- 1457 (K) Sighted and made SD Radar contact on plane (unidentified) distance two and one-half miles, bearing $250^{\circ}T$. Made quick dive. Plane dropped four bombs, fairly close. This is another instance where the SD Radar failed to give us ample warning. Plane approached from dead ahead, hiding behind cloud banks. Position Lat. $29^{\circ}-59'N$; Long. $156^{\circ}-32.30'E$.

April 16

- 1457 (K) Sighted patrol vessel, trawler type, bearing $255^{\circ}T$, distance eight miles. Made quick dive. Position Lat. $28^{\circ}-45'N$; Long. $138^{\circ}-23.5'E$.
- 1553 (K) Sighted smoke bearing $305^{\circ}T$, distance approximately twelve miles. Headed towards smoke at standard speed.
- 1630 (K) Sighted convoy consisting of four ships. One large freighter. One medium size freighter, one destroyer and one mine layer. Distance approximately 16,000 yds. Angle on bow $110^{\circ}P$. Came to normal approach course and proceeded at standard speed to close. Convoy passed ahead 7600 yards away. This was very disappointing to myself and the crew as they were the first sizeable targets we had

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 10, No. C-4 (Cont.)

seen in two patrols. Position Lat. 28°-43.5'N; Long. 138°-10'E.

U.S.S. Pompano

Fifth War Patrol.

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 1, C-1.

No. C-6

April 15

0233 (I) 34-16 N, 139-52 E, SJ radar contact at 9,100 yards. Tracked, course 005°, speed 9-1/2, one large ship and small escort. Conducted attack, no hits. Received a short, fairly close, depth charge attack, no damage. Heard further distant explosions during the day.

0804 (I) 34-22 N, 139-58 E, sighted plane.

April 16

1002 (I) 34-12 N, 141-11 E, sighted plane.

April 17

0105 (I) 34-21 N, 139-16 E, sighted small patrol boat.

1930 (I) En route down channel between KOZU and MIYAKE SHIMA, 8 miles from latter, moon 4 days before full, MIYAKE SHIMA Light suddenly extinguished after burning about an hour. A few minutes later noted what appeared to be flashing light signalling from shore toward us. Remembering how far submarines and small vessels may be seen from Diamond Head in bright moonlight believe we were sighted from ashore. Later encountered a small boat in the middle of the

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 10. No. C-6. (Cont.)

channel so made an end run to east of
MIYAKE and MIKURA SHIMA.
2037 (I) 34-14 N, 139-26 E, sighted patrol boat
similar to one this morning.

Case 11

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

12/1551 April

TO:

Enciphered Marcus Detachment
Commander

INFO:

(Yokosuka Hospital)(C)
(Yokosuka Trans Section)(B)

Translation only partial.

In accordance Yokosuka Naval Base Ord 98
depart blank (Saipan?) for
blank (Marcus?).
Expect arrive 0600 April 17.

Neon posits (April 15 through 16th and all North and
East):

13th, 15-() N, 147-18 E.
14th, 17-44 N, 148(?) -49 E.
15th, 20-10 N, 151-20 E.
16th, 22-34 N, 152-53 E.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 11 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

12/1945 April

THIS ULTRA FOR CROSS IN SEAWOLF X SERIAL 75 X PECAN
AVAILABLE FOR YOUR USE X POSIT 0300 GCT 14TH KEFW
4449 (17-44 N 149-49 E) ALGEROBA BOEN 1020 (20-10 N
151-20 E) ALGEROBA DNIQ 3453 (22-34 N 152-53 E)
X ARRIVES MARCUS 2100 16TH X GOOD LUCK

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Seawolf

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: NPM Fox schedules were received with
no difficulty except for a complete
fadeout of all Fox frequencies between
2000 and 2100 GCT at a distance of
approximately 3,700 miles west of
Pearl Harbor.

No. C-2

April 14

0849 (K) Arrived assigned position.

April 15

1614 (K) Sighted east of ship bearing 127 (T)
(Contact distance 8 miles. Developed following
1 & 2) situation: One large freighter, one small

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

coal-burning, trawler-type escort, radical zig, speed 10.5 knots through the water, 7 knots good along track, general course ENE, heading for MARCUS ISLAND, about 240 miles to go, giving us two nights and one day to work with. Worked ahead of him on his port flank, got in good position ahead just as dark closed in. Clear, bright, calm moonlight. Periscope visibility 7,000 yards or better. Dove at 7,000 yards range, used SJ radar at 40 ft. in to 4,200 yards, thereafter bearings and angle on the bow only, speed being constant at 10.5 knots.

1952 (K)
(Attack
No. 1)

Fired four torpedoes aft (first attack) ideal conditions. Could see him almost as well as in daytime (our periscopes are treated). First torpedo prematured at 14 seconds. One of remaining 3 hit, probably the second. Spread white light method but points of aim in doubt due to target being completely obscured by premature. Should have held up other torpedoes, but the Commanding Officer was so amazed at having the first war shot he has ever fired be a premature, particularly after having requested that the magnetic feature be left operative, that he forgot to hold up the others, and they left at their assigned 8 second intervals. Gyro angles were small, tracks were favorable, range good, speed certain. Depth settings 16 feet, sea flat. However, the premature had a fibre brush rigging disc. Also tubes were flooded only 5 minutes before firing and outer doors opened only two minutes before firing.

Both target and escort fired a gun in our general direction (orange flashes were circular, not long) and escort headed for us. Sound, torpedo room and others heard an explosion, not a depth charge, at 1 minute 30 seconds after the first torpedo

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- was fired, which gives a hit, for the second torpedo at about 2,000 yards. TDC range for it was 1,900 yards. The Commanding Officer did not see a hit. Subsequent attacks showed him slowed to 10 knots through the water. Other two missed due to maneuver of target, as he had over a minute after the premature to evade.
- 1954 (X) Went to 250 feet, as escort was heading for us at decreasing range, smoking heavily.
- 1957 (X) Two depth charges, not close.
- 1958 (X) One depth charge, not close.
- 2004 (X) One depth charge, not close. Both target and escort's screws followed by sound.
- 2105 (X) Screws fading out, periscope depth, nothing sighted. Surfaced.
- 2137 (X) Picked up target by radar and binoculars at 15,000 yards, started around his port flank again for another attack. Charged batteries on one engine. Surprised to pick him up so soon, although sound had not heard him increase speed. He even decreased slightly to 10.0 knots.
- 2304 (X) In good position ahead, dived, radar range 10,000.
- 2318 (X) Took last radar range (at 40 feet) of 4,200 yards, thereafter bearings and angles on the bow. Four minutes later had 1/2 field in periscope, giving target length of 550 feet.
- 2329 (X) Fired 3 bow tubes, torpez heads, influence exploders, set for 16 feet, range 1,650, about 100 starboard track, virtual straight shots, 8 seconds apart, white light method on middle, stern and bow. Two explosions at about 1 minute 10 seconds and 1 minute 15 seconds. Commanding Officer saw only one hit but black smoke obscured the target. Believe two hits, but do not know which one of the three missed. Sound followed all three out as hot straight and normal. Sound reported target stopped.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

2333 (K) Escort dropped one depth charge. Watched him a while till he headed at us, then went deep three minutes later, rigged for depth charge.

2337 (K) One depth charge, not close.

2349 (K) One depth charge, not close.

April 16

0029 (K) Periscope depth. Saw target stopped, escort circling at full speed. Decided to fire two torpedoes at escort to allow a free hand in finishing off the target, even though he had the lines of an old shoe. Started approach.

0119 (K) Fired 2 bow tubes 90 port track, virtual straight shots, speed 10, range 1,600 yards, set at 8 feet, estimated draft 10 feet, influence heads, TNT, spread white light at bow and stern. No hits. Estimated length 200 feet. This covered a speed range of 8 to 12 knots, therefore one must have been a dud. He fired several shots with his bow gun. Two distant explosions about 3 minutes 30 seconds and 5 minutes 30 seconds after firing. Could be our torpedoes at the end of their run. Escort appeared baffled, and we withdrew at periscope depth. By this time we had fired nine of our 20 torpedoes, with not much to show for it except one big ship stopped.

0143 (K) Decided to abandon further torpedo fire at escort, get in two good shots at the main target. Only 45 minutes of moon left. Started maneuvering for position.

0152 (K) Fired two carefully aimed shots from bow tubes, 100 port track, straight shot, 0 target speed, range 1,400 yards, set at 16 feet, influence heads, one torpex, one TNT (no more torpex left), 8 seconds firing interval. Record of times again confused, but about one minute later one big explosion at

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

base of stack clearly seen, which was point of aim for both. Sound could not say which torpedo hit; believe first one did, second one a dud or erratic. Bow of ship went immediately under to the stack, 25° down by the head. Escort headed for us immediately, so went deep. Six minutes after hit, one depth charge dropped. Withdrew at deep submergence expecting more charges, but none arrived. Fully expected target was sunk.

0250 (K) Periscope depth, nothing in sight, moon had set.

0253 (K) Surfaced. Radar picked up two pips, one large and one small almost immediately at about 7,500 yards, where target and escort had been left. Decided to withdraw to 10,000 yards and await dawn to see what manner of ship this was. The expenditure of eleven torpedoes without sinking anything, yet getting four hits, gave cause for concern.

0438 (K) Dived. Approached scene of night attack.

0752 (K) Got good look at target. Bow broken off at bridge, which was only slightly less than half her length, port side badly torn up in way of stack and a little aft of stack, down by the head 10 degrees, with a 15 degree port list, no signs of life. Escort passed within 300 yards of us while studying picture. Decided to patrol submerged all day in vicinity of possibility of either escort leaving, allowing us some deck gun practice at derelict, or maybe a fast destroyer would come out of Marcus today (10 hours at 20 knots). Neither happened, but a 2-engined land bomber circled the spot most of the morning.

1929 (K) Surfaced, after deciding that neither derelict nor escort worth more torpedoes since only nine remain on board, and that gun fire would be foolhardy with the escort still hovering around. Set course for area at one engine speed, 11.5 knots, as fuel

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

was not holding out as it should to two end-around chases, and adding some 800 miles to our distance to our area.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No: 1
Date: April 15
Time: 1614 K
Position: 21-06 N
131-54 E
Type: MPN freighter or passenger freighter
Course: 030 (Z-Z)
Speed: 10
Remarks: Similar to Husini Maru, page 83 of ONI 208-J, of 12,700 DWT tons, except length based on field vs. radar range gave 550 ft. instead of 505 ft., and stack was more squat, indicating diesel instead of coal. Did not smoke. Assumed 10,000 tons, could be more.

No: 2
Date: April 15
Time: 1614 K
Position: 21-06 N
131-54 E
Type: MPN trawler type escort
Course: Var.
Speed: 10
Remarks: Escort for above. About 1,000 tons, high forecastle and poop deep, wells heavy smoker. Ass't. approach officer described it as an old shoe.

Case 12

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Guard
Division 43)

05/1045 April

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 12, No. A-1 (Cont.)

TO: (CofS Yokosuka
Naval District)
(Fusimi Maru)
(4th Base Force,
Truk)

INFO:

" departed Palao for Tokyo at noon of 8th.
Speed 9, Point "A", 9-00 H, 132-00 E. Point "B",
25-00 H, 132-00 E. Scheduled to arrive
at noon on 17th after passing through points "A"
and "B".

Heem positions: 9th, 10° N, 132° E. 11th, 17° N,
132° E. 13th, 24° N, 132° E. 15th, 30-08 N, 135-34 E."

NEGAT COMMENT: Believes this is convoy but can not
get first of message.

No. A-2

FROM: (Guard
Division 43)
TO: (Unit in
Guard Div 43)

11/1703 April

INFO: (Garbled)

Weather report: Typhoon with 750 millimeter
barometer at 1200 in 7° N, 139° E moving North (?) blank.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 12, (Cont.)

B - Coorational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
INFO: CINCPAC
PRSC: PRIORITY

13/0611 April

PERAH OR MAPLE X BLANK X MINUS 1 X MINUS 900 X MINUS 2
QZBJ (21 NORTH 152 EAST) X 2 DAYS LATER FPGV 0834
(30 08 NORTH 135-34 East) AND 2 MORE DAYS LATER BPSX
4550 (35-45 NORTH 139-50 EAST) X TYPHOON AT HMAS
(7 NORTH 139 EAST) MOVING NORTH OR NORTH WEST X
SERIAL 77 F ULTRA

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pompano

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 1, C-1.

No. C-2

April 15

0233 (I) 34-16N, 139-52E. SJ radar contact at 9,100 yards. Tracked, course 005°, speed 9-1/2, one large ship and small escort. Conducted attack, no hits. Received a short, fairly close, depth charge attack, no damage. Heard further distant explosions during the day.

0904 (I) 34-22 N, 139-58 E, sighted plane.

April 16

1002 (I) 34-12 N, 141-11 E, sighted plane.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 12, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 17

- 0105 (I) 34-21 N, 139-13 E, sighted small patrol boat.
1930 (I) En route down channel between KOZU and
MIYAKE SHIMA, 8 miles from latter, moon
4 days before full. MIYAKE SHIMA light
suddenly extinguished after burning about
an hour. A few minutes later noted what
appeared to be flashing light signalling
from shore toward us. Remembering how far
submarines and small vessels may be seen
from Diamond Head in bright moonlight believe
we were sighted from ashore. Later en-
countered a small boat in the middle of the
channel so made an end run to east of
MIYAKE and MIKURA SHIMA.
2037 (I) 34-14 N, 139-26 E, sighted patrol boat
similar to one this morning.

Case 13

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: Blank originator
TO: (Rabaul
Address)
(11th Air
Fleet)
(Rabaul)
INFO: (Combined Fleet)
(Southeastern Area
Fleet)
(Air station in
Solomons)

12/1042 April

From Captain of Chokai

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 13, No. A-1 (Cont.)

1. Schedule of Chokai and blank is as follows:

Depart Truk at 0530 on 13th. Arrive Rabaul at 0415 on 15th.

2. Cargo of 12 small (?) landing barges and 2 large landing barges blanks.

NEGAT COMMENT: Between departure from Truk and arrival at Rabaul unrecovered grid positions are given for 1200 and 1800 on 14th.

No. A-2

FROM: (4th Base Force, Truk) 12/1850 April
TO:

(Flag Northern Section
Truk Escort Force)

INFO: (902nd Air Group)
(Truk Harbor Affairs)

*Tomorrow 13th. Departures. From South Channel. 0800. Chokai (escorted by Hagikaze, course after passing through Kimishima Channel 15).

0900. (Several Marus) (escorted by Minesweep #8, course after passing through Kimishima Channel 120). 1400. TAKERU Maru, #3. HAN Maru, Buho Maru (escorted by Subchaser #31, _____, and Yuzuki, course 257).

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 13, No. A-2 (Cont.)

1800. Toyonitsu Maru, Hagu tu Maru, Oshima (es-
corted by HAWI, course 18).

From North Channel.
 hours. Uzuki.

Arrivals. From North Channel.
1030 Subchaser .
1200 Maru escorted by .

GI COMMENT: TAKESAN Maru may be the Mitakezan
Maru. Oshima may be one of the Oshima's.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
EPM FCI
INFO:

13/0930 April

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MACGREGOR AND LADS IN PIKE MAY BE ABLE TO USE
THIS ULTRA X 37 PRANUP WITH IRONWOOD (DESTROYER)
LEFT SOUTH GATE OF HOT SPOT YOUR AREA AT 2300
GOT 12TH BEROUTE MFLQ 4500 (04-15 SOUTH 162-00
EAST) X BTA 2115 GOT 14TH X SUBPAC SERIAL 78 X
REGARDS

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Pike

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was very satisfactory.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 13 (Cont.)

No. C-2

April 12

0620 (K) While surfaced, Lat. 5-30 N., Long. 150-42 E., sighted enemy convoy, one small tanker, two medium merchant ships and one escort. Dove to attack. Fired stern tubes at the tanker. Missed. Target apparently sighted torpedo tracks as it was observed to turn sharply to parallel them. Escort then placed itself between us and targets which soon disappeared over the horizon. See details of action. All hands feel terrible - First chance we get we drop the ball.

1840 (K) Surfaced.

April 13-14

0800 (K) Submerged for SD radar contact - 5 miles. Plane not sighted. Must have been in sun. Lat. 3-30 N., Long. 148-32 E.

0802 (K) Depth charge explosion while passing 80 feet. Explosion occurred on port quarter, fairly close, knocking off paint and telephone in after torpedo room. No other damage. It was apparently set shallow.

2100 (K) Received Comsubpac Serial 78. In view of fact we are so near our mission of Serial 70, decided to maintain present plans, then attempt mission prescribed in Serial 78.

2300 (K) Smoke contact Lat. 2-10 N., Long. 148-00 E. Convoy believed to consist of two large Marus, one small Maru, and one escort. Tracked until 0150 (K) and submerged to attack. Could not obtain favorable firing position. At 0230 (K) surfaced and tried again. At 0453 (K) submerged to attack. At 0511 (K) fired four torpedoes at largest Maru and two at the other large

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 13, No. C-2 (Cont.)

one. Soundmen and all hands in forward torpedo room heard four distinct torpedo explosions followed by a series of apparent internal explosions. Commanding Officer in conning tower could only discern three torpedo hits with following rumbles and believes two hits in first and one in the second. Sound could only hear two sets of screws (one heavy and one light high speed) after the firing. Commanding Officer could not confirm because of a painfully bruised nose received from the shock on the periscope when first explosion occurred. Depth charges followed at about 5 minutes. See details of action.

Moan sets about 0130. There were numerous rain squalls around the horizon. Both the FIVE and the enemy were running in and out of them at frequent intervals.

0830 (K) Shock off escorts and remained submerged.
0845 (K) Surfaced.

Case 14

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

13/1601 April

TO:

(Yokosuka
Naval District CofS)(B)

(Transportation
Section Chief)(A)

INFO:

(Combined Fleet)(B)
(Naval General Staff,
1st Section)(A)

Yama Maru, possible Tonan Maru and 1 or 2 more Marus escorted by Subchaser #31 departed Truk at noon April 13 for Palao to arrive at 0800/April 18.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 14, No. A-1 (Cont.)

1. Noon positions follows:

April 14, 6-32 N, 148-20 E.
April 15, 6-12 N, 144-31 E.
April 16, 6-10 N, 140-40 E.
April 17, 6-37 N, 136-50 E.

2. Unreadable, but gives details of course, etc.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

14/1242 April

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR POSSIBLE USE BY PIRATE 3 OR 4 MAPLES WITH 1
LEMON ENROUTE TRUK TO PALAU X NOON POSIT ON 14TH
EWYU 3220 (6-32 N 149-20 E) AND ALGEROBA EWYA
1231 (6-12 N 144-31 E) X EWUL 1040 (6-10 N 140-40 E)
X EWKA 3750 (6-37 N 136-50 E) (X COMSUBPAC SERIAL
80 X

MAPLE * TYPE UNKNOWN
LEMON * RESCUE VESSEL

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pike

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Sas IV, Case 13, C-1.

No. C-2

April 15

0000 (K) Received Comsubpac serial 80. Distance
makes it impossible to execute mission
assigned.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 15

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

(Surface
Escort Unit #2)
(Base Force 4)
(#4 Harbor
Affairs)

13/1213 April

INFO:

(Saipan Base
Force #5)
(Combined Fleet)
(4th Fleet)

From garbled

At 0815, 14th depart Kure. Same date at 1700
arrive for passage through Bunge Channel. Upon
passage take course 145°, speed 16.

At 1300 (Q) on 15th in posit 51-05 N, _____° E.

1900, 16th 22-5 N, 136-35 E.

At 0700, 19th in 11-50 N, 143-55 E. Take course _____°.

1200, 20th 10-15 N, 150-00 E, course 105°.

At 0500, 21st 08-30 N, 152-30 E, course _____°.

At 1000 (about), 21st 07-20 N, 152-35 E, course
255° (82647).

Same date, 1400 will arrive West Channel, Truk.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 15 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

15/0125 April

PRES: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 816 FROM COMSUBPAC X ULTRA X FOR STINGRAY ONE
MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN) WHICH IS POSSIBLY 038 PEANUT
X BLANK (COURSE) X PLUS 6 PIT (SPEED 16 KNOTS) X
MINUS 200

(TIME 1000 GCT) X PLUS 1 (DATE 16TH) X DNKA 5035
(22-50 NORTH 136-35 EAST) X BLANK (COURSE) X PLUS 6
(SPEED 16 KNOTS) X PLUS 100 (TIME 1300 GCT) X
PLUS 3 (DATE 18TH)

X LKVT 5055 (11-50 NORTH 143-55 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

15/0151 April

PRES: PRIORITY

COMSUBPAC USES GCT TIME FOR THIS ULTRA SERIAL 82
TO PERMIT (SS78) X 1 MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN) WHICH
MAY BE 038 POPCORN AND WHICH PROBABLY IS MAKING 16
KNOTS BY PIT LOG WILL PASS THROUGH LKVT 5055
(11-40 N 143-55 E) AT 2000 ON 18TH, CFTG 1500
(10-15 N 150-00 E) AT 0300 ON 20TH AND TS1Q 3050
(8-30 N 152-50 E) AT 2000 SAME DATE X COURSE
BETWEEN LAST 2 POSITS MAY NOT BE DIRECT BUT WILL
PASS THROUGH LAST POSITION ON COURSE 195

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 15 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Stingray

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 9, C-3.

No. C-2

See IV, Case 10, C-4.

U.S.S. Permit

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete.

Last consecutive serial sent

Run Pot

Last consecutive serial received

Eighty One

The S.J. radar performed exceptionally well throughout the patrol. Until May 10, the S.J. was used only when poor visibility encountered and on dark nights.

No. C-4

April 13

(K)

Patrolling on PHILIPPINE - TRUK route.

0835	Sighted plane. Plane contact 5. Dived. Plane was on starboard beam headed at us.
1015	Surfaced.
1032	Sighted plane, plane contact 6. Radar picked it up after it was sighted. Dived.
1900	Surfaced.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 15, No. C-4 (Cont.)

April 19

(K)

0830 Still patrolling on PHILIPPINE - TRUK route.
Dived to avoid any planes out here.
1100 Surfaced.
2300 Abandoned this line and, proceeded to a position on a line followed by ships proceeding west from TRUK.

April 20

(K)

0700 On the line for ships proceeding west from TRUK.
0845 Dived to keep from being picked up by aircraft patrol.
1045 Surfaced and patrolled on one main engine on a zero float. No. 1 periscope, having been temporarily repaired, our coverage was increased to 30 miles certain.
2100 En route to SAIPAN - TRUK line where we saw first convoy. We were also covering the line west from TRUK.

April 21

(K)

Crossed GUAM - TRUK, SAIPAN - TRUK routes during the day, visibility poor but clouds high.
Rained all night.
Headed for TRUK - EMPIRE route recommended by WEALZ.

Case 16

A - Source of Intelligence

(The intercepted Japanese dispatch is not available. - Ed. Note)

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 16 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING
NPM FOI
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

15/1422 April

HERE IS HOT ONE FOR MOON CHAPPIE WHICH IS COMSUBPAC
ULTRA SERIAL 83 2 OAKS (AUXILIARY CARRIERS) ES-
CORTED BY 2 IRONWOODS (DESTROYERS) DUE TO DEPART
NORTH CHANNEL YOUR ATOLL 074516 -9 ON COURSE 320

- INTERCEPT -

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Permit

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 15, C-3.

No. C-2

April 13-15

En route area. Continued to hold daily
drill dives and problems. On the night
of the 13th, sent acknowledgement of
receipt of information concerning track
through our area.

April 16

0800 (K)

Entered Truk 200 mile circle.
Set course 286° at 15.5 knots for line
between Truk and Saipan. No. 1 periscope
tilting wire parted during the day.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 16, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 17

- 0610 (K) On Saipan-Truk line. Began patrol about 90 miles from Guam and Saipan.
- 0700 (K) Sighted D.D., contact 1, on course 320° (course for Saipan), speed 15-20 knots, angle on bow 90 port, distant about 10 miles. Manuevered on 4 engines to get on his track to intercept anything following him.
- 0800 (K) Dived.
- 0945 (K) Sighted convoy of 2 good looking freighters and another destroyer, contact #2. Commenced approach at standard speed on normal approach course. Minimum range obtained - 8000 yards with angle on the bow 90° port. Convoy on course to Saipan. Continued to follow the ships at 5 knots. Speed of convoy 9-10 knots. Tracked them until 1200 when they disappeared on 320°. Convoy was making infrequent but radical zigz. We couldn't get in an attack before the convoy would arrive at Saipan. There is a slight possibility that these ships were sent through to test the area. We decided to wait on this line.
- 1556 (K) Surfaced. Patrolling on line.
- 2200 (K) Left Truk-Saipan route and made for a patrol position on a route from the Philippines to Truk.

April 18

Patrolling on Philippine-Truk route.

April 19

Still patrolling on Philippine-Truk route.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 16 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No: 1
Description: Destroyer
Tonnage: 1700
Position: Lat. 13-18 N
Long. 147-10 E
Course: 320°
Speed: 18 K
Time: 0700
Date: April 17
Remarks: Hibiki type as shown in O.M.I. 14, Page 71.

No: 2
Description: Convoy of 2 freighters; 1 DD
Tonnage: 8000
1700
Position: Lat. 13-15 N
Long. 147-12 E
Course: 325°
Speed: 9 K
Time: 0945
Date: April 17
Remarks: Similar to U.S. C-3 ships. DD similar to contact No. 1.

Case 17

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (In Shanghai 14/1713 April
Area)
TO: Sako
Guard District) (B)
INFO: (2nd Section, Naval
General Staff) (B)

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 17, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Transportation
Section Chief) (A)

(Cinc South
CHINA FLEET) (B)

Charlie Convoy (possibly only one ship, cargo
unrecovered) depart Sama for via Takao.
Speed 9 knots. Expect arrive Takao on 19th at 0700.

Noon posits (commencing 15 April):

April 15 posit: 18-09 N, 102-58 E.
19-17 N, 112-37 E.
20-33 N, 115-16 E.
21-48 N, 117-57 E.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 17
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
EPM FOX
INFO:
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

15/1815 April

ADDEZ MY ULTRA SERIAL 84 H GOES TO RUNNER FOR
ACTION X 1 PECAN ENROUTE SAMA TO TAKAO GIVES
NOON POSITS 16TH RELG (19 N 112 E) 17TH REF 7
ALGAROA BQKD 3316 (20-33 N 115-16 E) PCPK
4857 (21-48 N 117-57 E) AND ARRIVES TAKAO 0700
19TH THRS MINUS 9 SPEED 9.5

G - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Runner

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 9, C-1.

No. C-2

See IV, Case 9, C-2.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 13

A - Sources of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ 14/1530 April
TO: _____
INFO: _____ (4th Fleet)

The #20 Yama Maru (6008 tons) will depart Lososop
for Mareyan at 1600 14th arriving there 0600/17th.

Neon positions: 15th, 6-30 N, 149-30 E.
16th, 7-00 N, 146-10 E.

B - Operational Dispatch

FROM: SUSPACCOM 16/0908
TO: SUBS COPYING NPM
FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PRES: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS GOES ULTRA TO PIKE SERIAL 87 FROM CONSUBPAC I
6,000 TON BEECH (FREIGHTER) ARRIVING WOLBAI ISLAND
AT 21 HOURS GCT 16TH X POSITION AT 3 HOURS GCT 15TH
ENFT 3030 (6 DEGREES 30 MINUTES NORTH 149 DEGREES
30 MINUTES EAST) ALGEROBA HMD 0010 (07 DEGREES 00
MINUTES NORTH 146 DEGREES 10 MINUTES EAST) X POSSIBLY
NO LEMEN (ESCORT VESSEL)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pike

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 13, C-1.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 18, (Cont.)

No. C-2

April 15

0000 (K) Received consubpac serial 80. Distance makes it impossible to execute mission assigned.
0530 (K) Submerged and maintained periscope patrol at 55 feet. Crew requires rest.
1315 (K) Sighted enemy plane through periscopes, lat. 3-00 N., long. 150-15 E.
1845 (K) Surfaced.

April 16

0530 (K) Submerged to periscope depth.
1845 (K) Surfaced.
2115 (K) Received consubpac serial 89. Distance involved too great to execute mission.

Case 19

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

14/1001 April

(Combined Fleet) (B)
(Kure Navy Yard
Commandant)
(Tokyo Transportation
Section) (B)
(Yokkaichi Trans-
portation Office) (B)

INFO: (Yokosuka Naval
Station) (B)
(Soerabaya) (B)
(Singapore Transportation
Office) (B)

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 19, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Unidentified vessel departed Singapore for Yokosuka
(?) at 1000/14 April.

Heam positions:

14th,	01-26 North,	104-51 East.
15th,	04-28 North,	106-11 East.
16th,	08-08 North,	109-42 East.
17th,	11-40 North,	113-13 East.
18th,	15-14 North,	116-48 East.
19th,	18-52 North,	120-21 East.
20th,	21-33 North,	124-38 East.
21st,	24-17 North,	129-12 East.
22nd,	28-45 North,	135-10 East.
23rd,	32-19 North,	138-00 East.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPN FOR

16/C223

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 88 J IS ULTRA X ALL SUBS NOTE IT IS BELIEVED
HIPS ARE NOW EMPLOYING A SMALL TOWED DEPTH CHARGE
CONTAINING 25 KILOGRAMS OF EXPLOSIVE CHARGE X BE
ON LOCKOUT FOR THIS X FOR RUNNER AND POSSIBLY
SEAHOLF X ONE MAPLE X BLANK BLANK X MINUS 900 X
PLUS FOUR X XTPK 5221 (18-52 N 120-21 E) ALGEROEA
PCB2 5338 (21-33 N 124-38 E) QZTY 1712 (24-17 N
130-12) CIGV 4510 (28-45 N 135-10 E)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Runner

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 9, C-1.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 19 (Cont.)

No. C-2

April 19

- 0020 (H) Sighted two patrol vessels. (Contact #2). Since we are trying to close the land we attempted to run around these vessels but could not shake them loose. They were sighted on and off for 4 hours and each time with a small angle on the bow. Minimum range was 4000 yards. This was a clear moonlit night and we may have been sighted. 0600 dove and proceeded toward the beach.
- 1837 (H) Surfaced and sighted sailing junk hull down. (Contact #3). As sky was overcast full moon showing only through clouds decided to lay mines if possible. Consequently proceeded towards harbor entrance steering various courses to evade detection by picket line. Indications were that considerable patrol activity could be expected. At
- 2142 (H) passed Pedro Blanco abeam to starboard distant 4 miles and set course for mine area. At
- 2150 (H) a line of 5 sailing junks was dimly visible on the port beam. (Contact #4). They were patrolling on a northerly course and apparently did not sight us. At
- 2220 (H) sighted a patrol vessel or destroyer on the starboard bow patrolling on a northerly course. (Contact #5). Altered course to southwest to pass clear and was not detected. At
- 2255 (H) visibility was improving and detection seemed imminent as two more dull shapes or sails were in sight on the port bow. This made it evident if mines were to be planted at all we had better start at once so dove and started planting mines in area as indicated on attached sketch.

April 20

- 0120 (H) Finished plant (32 MK. 12 mines) without having had any prematures and without detection. Surfaced and cleared area undetected. The long approach under a full moon made an undetected approach difficult and had

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 19, Ho, C-2 (Cont.)

we not had an overcast sky it would have been impossible to get in undetected as close to the harbor as we did. Incidentally, all other nights in this area were exceptionally bright, practically daylight. Days were also exceptionally clear with flat glassy seas. This approach was made on the surface in order to navigate and also have some juice left in the battery upon completion of the plant. A surface plant was ruled out as impracticable from a standpoint of detection and trim. Sighted 2 sailing junks (Contact #6).

0450 (H)

April 21

Patrolling surface and submerged en route Rianan Straits. At 1835 (H) Sighted masts of a steamer hull down and angle on the bow 90 starboard. (Contact #7). Commenced approach but could not close target. 1934 (H) Surfaced and started the chase. 2130 (H) Sighted target on expected track distant 15000 yards. SJ radar picked up target at 12000 yards and tracked him for one hour. Both plot and TDC tracked course 073 speed 12 knots. As moon was very bright decided on submerged periscope approach. At 2146 (H) Sighted two patrol vessels which are apparently trailing us (Contact #8). At 2249 (H) Dove and commenced approach. Picked up target at 7000 yards through periscope. As approach continued bearings indicated a slower speed and greater range so accordingly we cut his speed to 9 knots. At 2333 (H) Fired 3 bow shots, range 1500 yards, 90 starboard track, depth setting 15 feet, using a 2 degree divergent spread (Attack #1). Torpedoes were heard running toward target but no explosions were heard. Changed TDC set up to range 2500 yards speed 11 knots

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 19, No. C-2 (Cont.)

2338 (H) and torpedo depth setting to 10 feet. At
Fired 2 more bow tubes on 110-starboard
track with the fifth torpedo spread to
lead 3 degrees. Target was seen to turn
away and open fire with stern gun. Two
minutes after firing 2 dull explosions were
heard but were not believed to be torpedo
hits as target kept going.

April 22

0024 (H) While making a periscope exposure one more
explosion was heard from the vicinity of
the attack but no screws could be picked
up. At
0200 (H) Surfaced in bright moonlight to chase
target. At
0223 (H) Sighted 2 patrol boats which headed for us
at about 16 knots (Contact #9). En-
deavored to get around sub chasers to chase
target but so much time was lost we gave up
the chase when daylight showed no signs of
him. Ship was similar to Huzikawa Maru.

April 23

0300 (H) Sighted lights on horizon but could not make
out the vessel which were probably patrol
or fishing boats (Contact #10).

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No:	7
Date:	April 21
Time:	1835 (H)
Latitude:	20-45 N
Longitude:	113-09 E
Type:	One freighter
Remarks:	Huzikawa Maru type (Attack #1)

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 19 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Seawolf

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See IV, Case 11, C-1.

No. C-5

April 19

- 0112 (K) SD radar picked up KITA IWO JIMA Island (in Bonin group) at 23 miles. Not sighted till a short time later. Used radar detector in vicinity of these islands, negative results. Island is 2,680 feet high.
- 0520 (K) Sighted sampan, fishing, with lights. Avoided.
- 0810 (K) Sighted sampan, maintained course. He approached to 5,000 yards, then turned rapidly away. Left him alone. Very small.
- 0924 (K) Sighted masts of small tanker on horizon, course northerly (possibly en route YAP to YOKOHAMA), speed 10 knots, not zigging. He was broad on our starboard bow, our course westerly. Started tracking at 80-90 on four engines up his starboard side.
- 1130 (K) Set clocks back one hour to 1030(I).
- 1032 (I) In good position, dived. Made simple, elementary, approach, on 250 ft., 2,000 ton tanker named "BAHSIU MARU NO. 5" (from life rings). Also No. 360 was on his bridge. Cymav serial 890316 of March 6, 1942 (now obsolete) shows a picture of this ship under trawlers without any data. Picture is different from target in that target had well deck both forward and aft, and no mast aft of stack, and believed bigger.
- 1123 (I) Fired 2 torpedoes from bow tubes, 1,100 yards, 80 starboard track, straight shots, influence TNT heads, set to 12 feet, estimated draft 12 feet, speed 9.5 knots,
- (ATTACK
No. 5)

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 19, No. C-5 (Cont.)

1133 (I)

white light spread 1/4 length inside stern. Ping range at 1,950 yards checked mast-head height as 67 feet. One hit at point first torpedo was aimed, forward of bridge. Both ran hot, straight, normal. Hit was 45 seconds after first one was fired. Firing interval 10 seconds. Range in this case accurate, therefore second should have hit astern. Due to unknown target length, called the miss a control error.

1138 (I)

Ship sank by the head and to starboard after circling wildly. Series of four or five rapid explosions one minute later, quite heavy, which sounded like their depth charges going off at deep depth. Had large gun aft (5" plus). Surfaced. Chased down wreckage. About 30 survivors in boats and on wreckage. Picked up 3 life rings, one brief case, charts, tide table, etc. in effort to obtain intelligence material. Many empty oil drums. Heavy gasoline smell, but small slick. Must have been empty. Did not take any prisoners. All seemed stoical and crouched under nearest protection, no doubt expecting to be gunned. Had machine guns ready but did not fire. Took pictures both submerged and surfaced. Shortly after surfacing KGEI was heard to be broadcasting a resume of SEAWOLF past exploits, based on recent pictures in LIFE magazine.

1243 (I)

Abandoned area.

April 20

0614 (I)

Sighted sampan 5 miles, 3 mast, larger than 2 previous ones. Manned stations for battle surface, approached at 4 engine speed.

0642 (I)

Put a 3" shot across his bow at 2,500 yards. He turned towards at his best speed, released his nets, and started firing with small arms, falling well short. Commenced firing with 3 inch point detonating. Got him burning after about 15 rounds and

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 19, No. C-5 (Cont.)

- two passes at 2,400 to 1,500 yards, then closed for 6 pans (360 rounds) of 20 m.m. and more 3". He was probably 75 tons.
- 0700 (I) Ceased firing. 34 rounds of 3" expended, and about 12 hits. Afire furiously amidships. Point detonating with tracer seems to be fine ammunition against wooden craft. All but one appeared to burst, mostly inside, it seemed.
- 0730 (I) Left area, with 4 men still alive on stern, large fire and oil smoke amidships and forward.

April 22

- 0544 (I) Dived on SD radar contact, 4-1/2 miles closing. Plane not sighted in half light of mid-dawn.
- 0615 (I) Surfaced.
- 1130 (I) Set clocks back one hour to (-8) (HYPO) time.

April 23

- 0335 (H) OOD sighted darkened ship 075 (T) about 12,000 yards away. Clear bright moonlight calm sea. After approaching it developed into the following: badly damaged freighter adrift, stern badly blown up, stack blown off from a hit under bridge, 30 degree list to port, upper works so mutilated that original lines not clear, but with one set of goal posts still standing aft. She was circled by one small civilian salvage tug, one 1,000 ton trawler, and one WATANAKE destroyer. These details discovered later.
- 0417 (H) Dived after determining target group stopped, to approach by daylight and study the situation.
- 0514 (H) Decided freighter could wait and started jockeying for attack position on destroyer circling wreck slowly and pinging long scale.
- 0700 (H) Fired 3 torpedoes at destroyer, 1,050 yards, stern tubes, 106 starboard track, 5 knots, (ATTACK NO. 6) 4 seconds firing interval. One hit amidships. One and 1/2 minutes later fired a fourth

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 19, No. C-5 (Cont.)

torpedo at middle believing he had speeded up. Missed. The white smoke from his two stacks was no doubt steam from boiler explosion heard 5 seconds after first hit. This hit was an influence hit, as spray came up his far side. Draft 9 ft., depth setting 10 ft.

0709 (H) Target dead in the water. Fired 2 more
(ATTACK torpedoes as he wasn't apparently sinking.
NO. 7) Both missed.

0718 (H) Destroyer sank by the head. Many Japs in
whites left swimming. About 30 seconds
later an extremely loud explosion, but no
water column. Could be his depth charges
at very deep depth. Shook the ship
considerably. Took pictures.

0721 (H) Headed over for damaged freighter about
4,000 yards away. Other escorts apparently
unaware of destroyer's fate. Both the
other side of scene about 6,000 yards away.

0756 (H) Fired last torpedo at freighter. Passed
(ATTACK directly under target, did not go off.
NO. 8)

0801 (H) Went to battle stations surface, working
around to place freighter between us and
trawler escort. Planned to surface,
put 24 rounds of 3" into freighter's water
line and submerge before trawler could
bring guns to bear, using target as screen.

0809 (H) Small salvage tug heading this way and
making violent semaphore signals to trawler.

0819 (H) Not yet in good position, trawler now
heading for us at 3,000 yards full speed.

0820 (H) Abandoned idea of battle surface, went to
150 ft. and withdrew temporarily. Surprised
at no planes here yet. KIRUN on northern
Formosa only about 100 miles to the NW.

0832 (H) No depth charges, so came up to take a look.
Situation still the same, but both trawler
and tug close aboard freighter. Decided
to wait to see if they would open enough
to allow us to battle surface.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 19. No. C-5 (Cont.)

- 0843 (H) Sighted another destroyer, WATANAKE class, approaching scene from the south, 6,000 yards. Decided against battle surface, and retired at 175 ft. to the east. Stayed off all day at about five to ten miles, taking a look every four hours, waiting to see if escorts leave at dark.
- 1442 (H) Four distant depth charges, probably false contact at scene.
- 1500 (H) Began closing target, nothing in sight.
- 1835 (H) Surfaced 20 minutes after sunset, closed at high speed.
- 1850 (H) Smoke dead ahead, continued closing. Radar picked up target at 15,300 but bridge had him in sight before that - clear, dark, starry night. 7 x 50 binoculars with treated lenses are remarkably good.
- 2000 (H) Closed to about 5,000 yards. Small salvage tug apparently alongside freighter. Group still stopped. Another escort on far side of target. Too dark to risk surprise encounter with an unseen escort; moonrise in 20 minutes will reveal our presence and require diving; believe destroyer still there (some ship flashing signals to freighter); decided to retire and not risk a gun engagement.
- 2150 (H) Contact on SD radar at 19 miles. Probably plane over escort.
- 2355 (H) Stopped to transmit message reporting torpedo expenditure and that we were returning to Midway.

No. C-6

Description of Contacts

No: 3
Date: April 20
Time: 0843
Position: Lat. 25-37 N.
Long. 135-52 E.
Type: Wood Fishing
Sampan 75 T.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 19. No. C-6 (Cont.)

Course:	Var.
Speed:	Var.
Remarks:	34 rounds of 3" point detonating and 360 rounds 20 mm. left him burning fiercely with 4 men still alive on stern.

Case 20

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: Unknown originator 14/1039 April
TO: _____
INFO: _____

Convey 14 B () departed _____ for PT (Truk)
at 0900 on 14th.
Neen positions 14th to 24th:

15th, 32-04 North, 138 East.
16th, 23-50 North, 138-25 East.
17th, 25-30 North, 139 East.
18th, 22-10 North, 139- East.
19th, 19-00 North, 139-04 East.
20th, 15-40 North, 140-10 East.
21st, 12-40 North, 140-32 East.,
22nd, 10-30 North, 143-50 East.
23rd, 08-30 North, 145-30 East.
24th, 07-20 North, 149-40 East.
On 25th at 0100 pass through point "D".

COMMENT: Composition looks like 3 or 4 Marus es-
corted by 1 or 2 subchasers.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 20 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: PIKE PERMIT
INFO: CINCPAC

22/0736 April

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

NUMBER 1 GOES ULTRA FROM COMSUBPAC TO PIKE AND PERMIT
WHO CAN BOTH USE BUT WATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER X
PSCAN WITH SMALL LEMONS AT 3 HOURS GCT 22ND X GFTT
3030
(10 DEGREES 30 MINUTES NORTH 143 DEGREES 50 MINUTES
EAST) ALGEROSA TSME 3030
(08 DEGREES 30 MINUTES NORTH 145 DEGREES 30 MINUTES
EAST) X HMT 2040 (07 DEGREES
20 MINUTES NORTH 149 DEGREES 40 MINUTES EAST) THENCE
TO WEST ENTRANCE

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING HPM
FOX
PIKE
PERMIT
INFO: CINCPAC

23/0832 April

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ADDITIONAL DOPS FOR PIKE AND PERMIT X COMSUBPAC
SERIAL 5 X ULTRA X PSCAN MENTIONED MY SERIAL 1 WILL
PASS THROUGH HMT 2040 (07-20 N 149-40 E) at 0300
GCT 24TH AND THROUGH SWTG 5330 (06-53 N 150-30 E) AT
1800 GCT SAME DATE

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Permit

Right War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 20 (Cont.)

No. C-2

April 22

En route to TRUK - EMPIRE route.

- 0830 (K) Dived on radar interference. Must be plane.
Plana contact 7.
1430 (K) Surfaced. Weather poor for surface running
as clouds were low.

April 23

En route TRUK - EMPIRE route. Wondered if
200 mile circle ban is still effective.
Considered possibility of covering area
just west of TRUK. Decided it to be im-
practical.

- 0727 (K) Radar interference which must be plane.
Plans contact 8. Dived.
1021 (K) Surfaced.
2100 (K) Headed down TRUK - EMPIRE route for position
off MURILLO Island.

April 24

En route to point off MURILLO Island.

- 0642 (K) Overcast with low ceiling. Dived.
0922 (K) Cleared somewhat. Surfaced.
1115 (K) Radar interference. Plane contact 9.
1120 (K) Dived. Low ceiling with occasional rain
squalls.
1550 (K) Surfaced. Set course to MURILLO Island.

April 25

Off MURILLO Island about 20 miles.

- 0535 (X) Weather overcast. Dived. Conducted periscope
patrol.
1817 (K) Surfaced 20 miles north of eastern most
island. Passed a short distance east of
island during day. Set course for position
off NAMOHUITO Islands.

ORIGINAL
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Case 20, No. C-2 (Cont.)

2340 (K) Sighted white light distance 5 to 7 miles bearing 197°. Contact 3. Closed the light and watched it. Felt it might be serving as a beacon or as submarine bait. It was stationary.

U.S.S. Pike
Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

April 22

2200 (X) Received consubpac serial 1 - changed course and increased speed to execute mission.

April 23

0030 (K) Sighted unidentified enemy A/S vessel...at lat 4-20N., Long 152-02E. Commenced tracking, but radar out of commission. At 0105 turned in to attack. Target obscured by rain squall and when next observed, range had decreased to about 2000 yards, angle on bow zero, and target turned searchlight on us. At 0130, we submerged to 250 feet. (8 depth charges very close to Pike. Pike submerged. Ed. note)....

April 24

0000 (X) Received consubpac serial 5. Distance now too great to execute mission.

No. C-4

Description of Contacts

Date: April 23
Time: 0030 (X)
Position: Lat 4-20 N
Long 152-02 E
Type: 1 patrol
Course: 180
Speed: Varying
Remarks: Small high speed warship

ORIGINAL
15 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

May, 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 34

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 32

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 0
2. Submarine not in area..... 9
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 0
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 22
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarines 0
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 1
7. Information cancelled as incorrect... 0

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 2

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 1

- (1) Sunk..... 0
- (2) Damaged..... 1
- (3) No perceptible damage.... 0
- (4) Missed..... 0

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked.. 1

- (1) Unfavorable position
of submarine..... 0
- (2) Rough weather-poor
visibility..... 0
- (3) Submarine attacked by
escorts..... 0
- (4) Target showed hospital
ship markings..... 1
- (5) Engaged with other
targets..... 0
- (6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure..... 0

2. Quality of the Contact
(according to chart - May)

- A. Positive..... 1
- B. Probable..... 1
- C. Possible..... 0

III. Number of Potential Targets for which the
Results are Unknown..... 0

* Convoy of unknown number of Ships has been
Considered as but one target.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

May 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine (Addressee(s))	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
1.	07-1459 07-1630 08-0711	All subs, Salmon C.O.	Possibly enemy carrier at 34N, 162E at 1051 (GCT) May 7.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. Salmon activity hampered by storm.
2.	17-0640	U.S.S. Seal	Large task force con- sisting of 5 destroyers, 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 3 battleships departed Truk at 0300 (GCT) May 17 on course 300.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Seal patrolled north of Truk on May 17 and 18 but sighted nothing.
		U.S.S. Whale		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Whale patrolled the Truk- Empire route and the Saipan area on April 20 but sighted nothing.
	18-0749	U.S.S. Sauri	Instructions to patrol Sauri area between 139 and 141E in search for task force of 17-0640.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Sauri patrolled area 29N, 139E on April 21 and 22 but did not sight the Ultra target
3.	25-1017	U.S.S. Sailfish	Three or four Japanese submarines passing in- side Kurile Chain en- route from the Empire to Paramushiru.	None	ComSubPac dispatch probably received. The Sailfish patrolled down the west side of the Kuriles May 27-29 but sighted no submarines.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

May 1942

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Position, Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
4.	27-1803	U.S.S. <u>Gunfish</u>	Five unidentified on ships and one DD on course 094 to enter South Gate 2100 (GCT) May 27. At the same time three unidentified ships and an escort will leave via the North Gate. Also one unidentified ship on course 174 to leave South Channel at 0530 (GCT) May 28.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Gunfish</u> was far west of Truk on May 27 and 28.
		U.S.S. <u>Seadragon</u>		Probable	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Seadragon</u> at 0722 (GCT) May 28 sighted a passenger freighter at 07-00N, 151-55E on course 185 and pursued it until hospital ship markings became visible.
		U.S.S. <u>Beal</u>			ComSubPac dispatch may not have been received because of poor reception. The <u>Beal</u> was north of Truk.
5.	27-2345	U.S.S. <u>Pogy</u>	Warning that two enemy patrol boats and an enemy submarine might be in position 37-50N, 148E on May 27.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Pogy</u> was in this area but made no contact.
6.	20-1742	U.S.S. <u>Gunfish</u>	Two auxiliary carriers, one cruiser and three destroyers, due to arrive North Channel at 0000 May 29. Course 219.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Gunfish</u> did not arrive in the Truk area in time to intercept the ships.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

May 1943

No.	ComSubpac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
7.	30-1745	U.S.S. <u>Finback</u>	Convoy with one escort vessel headed for Finback area. 0300 (GCT) positions for May 30-June 1 will be: 7-38N, 146-45E; 7-35N, 142-38E; 7-22N, 138-25E.	Positive	ComSubpac dispatch received. The <u>Finback</u> attacked an AK similar to the <u>Tatukami Maru</u> and an escort similar to American PC boats at 0134 (GCT) on June 1 at 7-24N, 138-07E. One torpedo hit amidships on the AK possibly sinking the ship.

8.	30-1740	U.S.S. <u>Sunfish</u>	Genyo Maru to be at 7-11N, 151-47E at 0730 (GCT) on May 31.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The <u>Sunfish</u> was in this area but did not contact the maru.
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ORIGINAL
10 December 1945 (

CHAPTER V

May 7, 1943

Case 1

On May 7 at 1630 (GCT) ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Salmon to watch for the Rari 7, a possible enemy carrier which had been located by direction-finder in position 34 N, 162 E at 1051 (GCT) on that same day.¹ On the morning of May 8, all American submarines en route between the Empire and Midway were ordered to be on the alert for the enemy carrier.²

At 2000 (GCT) on May 7, the Salmon noted in its log that it had received the information about the carrier.³ During the following two days, a heavy storm forced the submarine to slow its speed and because of this, no contact was made with the enemy vessel reported in Ultra.⁴

May 17, 1943

Case 2

From an intercepted Japanese dispatch of May 16, ComSubPac learned that a large task force was

-
- 1 - V, Case 1, B-1 - B-2 - A-1.
 - 2 - V, Case 1, B-3.
 - 3 - V, Case 1, C-2.
 - 4 - Ibid.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

departing from the North Channel of Truk at 1200 (I)
on May 17.⁵ This intelligence, plus the information that
the force included five destroyers, one carrier, two
cruisers, and three battleships, were sent to the U.S.S.
Seal and the U.S.S. Whale in Ultra 170640.⁶ On the next
day all submarines along the south shore of Honshu were
warned of the movement of the task force, and the U.S.S.
Saury was directed to patrol in the vicinity between
139 and 141 degrees east on May 20 through 22 in order
to intercept the enemy vessels. Their routing and
destination were unknown, but it was thought that they
might be heading for Area 4.⁷

Having received ComSubPac's 170640, the
U.S.S. Seal set engines at full speed in order to cover
possible positions of the enemy task force to the east
of Mamontito Island. A series of explosions similar to
depth charges was heard to the southward on the following
day, May 18, but nothing was sighted, and there was no
contact with the Ultra target.⁸

On May 17 and 18, the U.S.S. Whale was
enroute to its assigned area. As the submarine was about
to cross the steamer lanes between Truk and the Empire

5 - V, Case 2, A-1 - A-4.

6 - V, Case 2, B-1.

7 - V, Case 2, B-2; see Map of Pacific, p. 172, for
area location.

8 - V, Case 2, C-2.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

on May 20, it spent one day on surface patrol; however, the results of the search was negative. From May 21 to 23 it patrolled in the Saipan area fruitlessly.

The U.S.S. Saur apparently received the ComSubPac dispatch and on May 20 through 22 the submarine patrolled in the vicinity of 29 N, 159 E in search of the task force. Nothing was sighted except what appeared to be a patrol or fishing vessel, and there was no contact with the task force reported in Ultra.

May 25, 1943

Case 3

In an operational dispatch of May 25 at 1017 (GWT) ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Sailfish that three or more Japanese submarines would be passing inside the Kuril chain en route from the Empire to Paramushiro. The Sailfish, after refueling at Midway on May 21, proceeded to its assigned area via the Kuril Islands. Although the submarine patrolled the area reported in Ultra from May 27 through May 29, the enemy submarines were not sighted.

- 9 - V, Case 2, C-4.
- 10 - V, Case 2, C-6 - C-7.
- 11 - V, Case 3, B-1.
- 12 - V, Case 3, C-2.
- 13 - Ibid.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

May 27, 1943

Case 4

From a Japanese dispatch, operational headquarters learned that at 2100 (GCT) on May 27, five merchantmen and one destroyer on course 94 would enter the South Channel of Truk. Simultaneously three other merchant vessels with an escort were to depart via the North Channel on course 33, and at 0530 (GCT) on May 28 one merchantman on course 174 was leaving by the South Channel.¹⁴

This intelligence was sent to the U.S.S. Sunfish and the U.S.S. Seadragon for action and to the U.S.S. Seal for information.¹⁵

On May 27, the Sunfish began a close-in reconnaissance of Fais, far west of Truk, and at 0419 (GCT) on May 28 at position 10-08 N, 141-21 E a periscope was sighted. The contact was lost, however, and there was no attack. Not until May 29 did the submarine set its course for the Truk-Saipan route.¹⁶ Although the ComSubPac message was received,¹⁷ there was no contact with the targets reported in Ultra 271803.

14 - V, Case 4, A-1 - A-3.

15 - V, Case 4, B-1.

16 - V, Case 4, C-2 - C-3.

17 - V, Case 4, C-1.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

The Seadragon was patrolling at Truk off the South Pass from May 24 to May 29. At 0722 (GCT) May 28 it sighted a passenger-freighter leaving Truk at 07-00 N, 151-55 E on a course estimated to be 185 degrees. The submarine pursued, discovered the vessel to bear the markings of a hospital ship, and so abandoned the pursuit.¹⁸ This is a probable contact with the third Ultra target which was scheduled to leave the South Pass at 0530 (GCT) April 28 on course 174.

Radio reception for the Seal, patrolling north of Truk, was not complete, and it is possible that Ultra 271303 was not received. No contact (with the Ultra target)¹⁹ was reported.

Case 5

Two Japanese northern patrol units originated contact reports of an enemy submarine in position 37-50 N, 148 E. They later identified the vessel as a friendly submarine and Communications Intelligence, upon interception of the dispatch, learned that a Japanese submarine and two picket boats were in the above position

18 - V, Case 4, C-5 - C-6.
19 - V, Case 4, C-7 - C-8.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

20
on May 27.

ComSubPac received the information and dispatched it to the U.S.S. Pogy in Ultra 272345, warning the submarine to "watch your step when passing the vicinity." 21 The Pogy received the dispatch, and on May 27 22 conducted a submerged patrol near the shore of the Empire, approximately seven degrees west of the given position. Whether the Pogy was seeking to avoid or to contact the enemy submarine is unknown. It was not 23 sighted.

May 28, 1943

Case 6

At 0000 (GST) on May 29 two carriers with a cruiser and three destroyers were scheduled to arrive at the North Channel of Truk on course 219. 24 The U.S.S. Sunfish received this information in ComSubPac's Ultra 25 281742, and on the following day, proceeded submerged to the Truk-Saipan route. On May 31 the submarine arrived at position 10-40 N, 149-15 E and then set its course for Truk. Apparently the Sunfish did not arrive in the area in time to intercept the enemy vessels, since no contact

-
- 20 - V, Case 5, A-1.
 - 21 - V, Case 5, B-1.
 - 22 - V, Case 5, C-1.
 - 23 - V, Case 5, C-2.
 - 24 - V, Case 6, A-1 - A-2.
 - 25 - V, Case 6, B-1.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

25
with the Ultra target was reported.

May 30, 1943

Case 7

From an intercepted Japanese report, operational headquarters learned that a convoy with escort was departing Truk, its noon positions scheduled to be 7-58 N, 146-45 E; 7-35 N, 142-38 E and 7-25 N, 138-25 E on May 30, 31 and June 1, respectively.

This information was sent to the U.S.S.
28
Finback for action in Ultra 301745. The message was
29
received, and on May 31 the submarine began a surface patrol along the Truk-Palau route. At 0134 (GCT) on June 1, at position 7-24 N, 138-07 E a freighter, similar to the Tatsumaki Maru, with an escort vessel was sighted. The zigzagging target was trailed until 2012 (GCT) when the Finback attacked. Three torpedoes were fired, the first hitting amidships, the second and third missing the
30
freighter. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target

Case 8

In ComSubPac's 301740, the U.S.S. Sunfish learned that at 0730 (GCT) on May 31 the Gento Maru

-
- 25 - V, Case 6, C-2.
 - 27 - V, Case 7, A-1.
 - 28 - V, Case 7, B-1.
 - 29 - V, Case 7, C-1.
 - 30 - V, Case 7, C-2 - C-3.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

31

would be at position 7-41 N, 151-47 E. On the day that the target was reported to be in the Truk area, the submarine arrived at the Truk-Saipan route and set its course for Truk. A search was conducted, but no contact

32

was reported with the Ultra target.

31 - V, Case 8, A-1.

32 - V, Case 8, C-2.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 343

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

APPENDIX V

Intelligence, Operational Dispatches, Submarine
Action Reports and Verifications - May, 1943

Case 1

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

Unident 3rd Fleet unit (MOTO 4) originated several on May 6 which suggest he may be carrier or plane group which possibly became active between April 13 and May 6. At 1215/6 he sent one to Kure Air Station info 3rd Fleet Staff, Yokosuka Air Arsenal, Kure CofS and unident Empire Aircraft Works (KAMIKU) and unident MAMU 7. MAMU 7 originated one which HENI 2 sent to MOTO 4 on 6650 KC 12 minutes after filing. Since HENI 2 appeared on 3815 channel only once, whereas bases usually appear daily, it is believed MOTO 4 is combatant (?) carrier, MAMU 7 is CarDiv staff and HENI 2 is CarDiv Flagship. If this is correct at least two carriers are indicated in Japan on May 6th. Carrier RARI 7 homed plane 9 IRA 3 on 7035, well established carrier plane channel used by Oahu Striking Force and subsequently in Solomons actions. He was poorly DF'd at 34N, 162 E (except for one poor Dutch Harbor bearing, fix placed Empire area).

(NPM*-072004-May-P-COMP-CETYH)
(Part 2 of 6)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMTASKFOR 16

07/1459 May

* Radio Station, Honolulu, Hawaii.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 1, No. B-1 (Cont.)

COM 14
MIDWAY
COMSUBPAC

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

RARI 7 (POSSIBLE CARRIER) DOG FOXED 34 NORTH
162 EAST AT 1051 GCT MAY 7 ON 7035 KILOCYCLES X
CONSIDERED POOR FIX XX THIS ULTRA

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 17
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
NICHOLAS CO. OF SALMON
INFO: CIECPAC

07/1630 May

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

BY DE A POSSIBLE ENEMY CARRIER LOCATED IN
POSITION 34 NORTH 162 EAST AT 1051 GCT ON
7TH X FIX CLASSED AS POOR

No. B-3

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX

08/0711 May

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ALL SUBS ENROUTE BETWEEN KAPPA AND MIDWAY
RE ON ALERT FOR ENEMY CARRIER X POOR DE AT
11 HOURS GCT MAY 7TH PLACED HER AT 34 NORTH
162 EAST X COMSUBPAC SENDS ULTRA SERIAL 39D X
SAURY DEPARTED PEARL FOR 11A VIA MIDWAY

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Salmon

Sixth War Patrol

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 1 (Cont.)

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was not complete. The following serials were missed; 32, 33, and 83.

No. C-2

May 8

0700 (L) Received information of possible enemy carrier on our track.

May 9-10

Forced to slow down to ride out heavy storm. Lowest barometer reading 28.70.

May 13

0430 Sighted Hachijo Shima at 15 miles. Sighted sampan lights. Submerged for the day to conduct periscope patrol across empire route. Sighted several sampans only. Routed torpedoes.

Case 2

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Base For #4, 16/1653 May
Truk)

Tomorrow the 17th May. Arrivals South Channel:
0900 - Hagikaze.

Departures North Channel.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2. No. A-1 (Cont.)

1200 - Musashi, Hiyo*, Kongo, Haruna, Tone,
Chikuma, Shigure, Ariake, Numikaze, Suzutsuki,
Hatsuyuki (course 300).

1 00 - Blank Maru (escorted by Gami course
270 after 4 miles blank).

Departures South Channel.

1300 Ko blank Maru (escorted by #32 Kusantei,
course 235/245).

* Hiyo looks out of place in BEs but is reading
as received.

REST OF HEADING 8 MINUTES LATER.

(Part 1 of 2).

No. A-2

TO:

(Torishima Maru)
(Subchaser 10)
(Escort vessel)

(Northern Sector,
Truk Surface Force)

(Eagorono Maru)

(#1 Kitisho Maru)

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 2, No. A-2 (Cont.)

Were all action addressees of the despatch reported 3 minutes earlier while the info addressees were:

(902 Air Group)
(22 Escort Unit)
(4th Fleet)
(4th Harbor
Affairs Section).

(Part 2 of 2)

No. A-3

FROM: (Base Force 4) (C) 16/1653 May
TO: (Torishima Maru) (B)
(Pat vessel in Base Force 4) (B)
(Hagoromo Maru) (B)
(Patrol vessel in Base Force 4) (B)
(Pat vessel in Base Force 4) (B)
(Truk Surface Pat For) (B)
(Pat vessel in Base Force 4)
(Asei Maru) (B)
(Pat vessel in Base Force 4)
(Pat vessel in Base Force 4)
(vessel) (B)
(Air Group 802) (B)

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2, No. A-3 (Cont.)

INFO: (Comb. Fleet) (C)
(4th Fleet) (B)
(Harbor Off.
Sect. 4 Truk) (B)

Tomorrow the 17th May. Arrivals South Channel:

0900 - Hagikaze.

Departures North Channel.

1200 - Musashi, Hiyon, Kongo, Haruna, Tone, Chikuma, Shigure, Ariake, Umikaze, Suzutsuki ?, Hatsuyuki ? (course 300).

I_30 - Nippon Maru (escorted by blank Onami course 270 - blank miles - course 280)

Departures South Channel.

1300 - Koryo or Korin Maru (escorted by #32 Kusantai, course 235/245).

*Hiyon looks out of place in BBs but is reading as received.

(16-May/DI)

No. A-4

FROM: (Base Force 16/1653 May
#4 Truk)
TO: (Torishima -
Maru)
(Kihjo Maru)
(#2 Hagarono Maru)
(Northern Section,
Truk Surface Force)

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2, No A-4 (Cont.)

(Osei Maru)

(51 Kitisho Maru)

INFO: (902nd Air Group)
(#2 Escort
Unit)
(4th Fleet)
(4th Harbor
Affairs Section)

Tomorrow the 17th May. Arrival South Channel:

(Part 1 of 2)

0090 - Hagikaze

Departures North Channel:

1200 - Musashi, Hiyo*, Kongo, Haruna,
Tone, Chikuma, Shigure, Ariake,
Unikaze, Suzutsuki, Hatsuyuki;
(course 300).

1_00 - Blank Maru, (escorted by Onami,
course 270, after 4 miles blank.

Departures South Channel:

1300 - KO blank Maru (escorted by #32
Kusentei, course 235/245).

12Z COMMENT: *Hiyo looks out of place in BB's
but is reading as received.

(Part 2 of 2)

GI COMMENT: This is corrected copy changing
Nuzikaze to Unikaze and listing
latest idents.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 17 17/0640 May
TO: SEAL
WHALE
ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS UTMOST FOR SEAL AND WHALE X LARGE TASK
FORCE OF 5 IRONWOOD (DESTROYER) 1 ASH
(CARRIER) 2 COTTONWOOD (CRUISER) 3 FIRS
(BATTLESHIPS) DEPARTED TRUK 0300 OCT 17TH
ON COURSE 300 X SUBPAC SERIAL 64 X

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC 18/0749 May
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: ROUTINE

COMSUBPAC ULTRA SERIAL 65 0 X LEAVING
THE FOCAL POINT OF AREA 15 1 ASH 2 COTTONWOOD
3 FIRS 5 IRONWOOD X 1250 X BLANK X MINUS
900 X PLUS 2 X ROUTING AND DESTINATION UN-
KNOWN BUT POSSIBLY HEADING FOR AREA 4 X

ALL SUBS ALONG SOUTH SEORE HONSEU BE ON
ALERT X SAURY SPEND 20-22 MAY PATROLLING
VICINITY YOUR ROUTE BETWEEN 139 DEGREES
AND 141 DEGREES EAST IN ORDER INTERCEPT X
BE ON LOOKOUT FOR PROBABLE AIR PATROLS
FROM BONINS

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Seal

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception was not satisfactory while on station. At Palau reception was impossible due to distance. At Truk consistent reception was impossible due to strong local radio interference on nearby frequencies.

No. C-2

May 17

0459 (J) Submerged. Lat. 9-12N, Long. 150-37E.
1915 (J) Surfaced.
2216 (J) Went to full speed on four engines to cover possible positions to eastward of HAKONUITO ISLAND of task force mentioned in ComSubPac dispatch 170640.

May 18

0445 (J) Submerged. Lat. 9-36N, Long. 150-58E.
1701 (J) Heard distant dull explosion, apparently to southward.
1706 (J) Heard first of eight distant explosions similar to depth charges.
1714 (J) Heard first of eight more explosions. Nothing in sight.
1913 (J) Surfaced.

U.S.S. Whale

Fourth War Patrol

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 2 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Radio Reception: During this patrol radio reception was good. Last consecutive serial received SubPac 102 Zebra. Last consecutive serial sent - 2 Serial 45 was not received but was obtained from U.S.S. Sperry.

No. C-4

May 17

1417 (L) 215 miles bearing 245 T from Wake Island - lookout sighted aircraft very low on horizon distance about 12-15 miles. Submerged. SD radar did not pick up plane - probably due to low altitude. Believe we were not sighted. Type aircraft - unidentified.

1529 (L) Surfaced and continued en route area.

May 18

1705 (L) 450 miles from nearest Jap Base - ~~ENINETOX~~ - Lookout sighted plane low on horizon distance 10-12 miles - submerged.

1750 (L) Surfaced and continued en route area.

May 20

(KING)

As were about to cross steamer lanes between Truk and the Empire decided to spend one day on surface patrolling lanes. Experience on previous patrols in this vicinity indicated that this was a very likely spot to pick up some tonnage.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-4 (Cont.)

May 20 (Cont.)

2000 (K) Results of day's search negative so headed for area.

May 21

1020 (K) Entered area 110 miles from Saipan. Submerged to remain undetected on final approach to Saipan.

1932 (K) Surfaced.

May 22

0116 (K) Passed between Anatahan and Farallon de Madenilla Islands and set course for Tanapag Harbor, Saipan.

0432 (K) Submerged. Approached to within two miles of reef of Tanapag Harbor just west of Toro Point. Only one ship was observed in the harbor. This ship was similar to the MEIYO MARU which had been damaged by the "WHALE" on her second patrol, about 200 miles east of Saipan. No other activity noted. No anti-submarine patrols sighted. General information the same as given in last patrol report. Only one aircraft sighted over Saipan - float type zero fighter. Decided to investigate Iaulan Bay so headed south along eastern coast of Saipan. Nothing sighted.

1936 (K) Surfaced and commenced patrol of Saipan-Truk route.

May 23

0430 (K) Submerged on line between Saipan Channel and Truk.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-4 (Cont.)

May 23 (Cont.)

- 0754 (X) Sighted aircraft - identified as a KAWANISHI type 97.
- 0814 (X) Sighted aircraft - MITSUBISHI type 96 - appeared to have taken off from northern point on Tinian Island.
- 0913 (X) Sighted second aircraft - similar to one seen at 0814.
- 1935 (X) Surfaced after a very dull and unprofitable day. Proceeded towards Rota to investigate the alleged existence of a submarine base.

U.S.S. Saury

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete insofar as is known. All schedules were copied. Last message sent was SAURY 061901 of June 1943. Last consecutive serial received was 24 Jig.

No. C-6

May 20

Bottom dropped out of the barometer starting at midnight. Center of typhoon passed through our position about 1400. (L). Visibility 200-20,000 yards, patrolling on surface.

May 21

Continued patrol. Storm abated. Visibility unlimited. Using periscope (high) as additional lookout station.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-6 (Cont.)

May 21 (Cont.)

1756 (X) Sighted (by periscope) what appeared to be a patrol or fishing vessel (contact #2) distance about 8-9 miles to the west, on a southerly course. Avoided by heading north. Continued patrol.

May 22

0851 (X) Sighted (by periscope) what appeared to be same patrol or fishing vessel as yesterday (position about the same) (contact #3) on northerly course bearing west distance about 9 miles. Avoided by heading east and then north, but again at 1045 (X) sighted boat (by periscope) bearing 248 degrees true; distance 12 miles; vessel was circling. Cleared vicinity by heading north and then continued surface patrol.

1250 (X) Sighted (by Navigator) heavy black smoke bearing 035 degrees true, distance about 20,000 yards. Commanding officer looking through periscope decided it was not smoke but a heavy ship with angle on bow zero. Submerged at 1251 (X) and commenced approach by heading 030 T. Something was fishy about the whole setup since the range did not vary and the bearing was almost constant. The navigator emphatically reassured himself that this was solid smoke while the Captain felt it was solid ship. Nevertheless at 1359 (X) surfaced with intention of closing and making an end around and getting a better look at the target. Upon surfacing our faces were extremely red; it was solid all right, solid rock.

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-6 (Cont.)

May 22 (Cont.)

We had made an unsuccessful attack on Lot's Wife. (The view of Lot's Wife facing page 657 Japan Pilot Vol. II is excellent). Visibility today is unlimited.

No. C-7

Description of Contact

Contact Number: 2
Date: May 21
Time: 1756 (K)
Position: 29-15N - 139-33E.
Course: 180
Speed: - - -
Description: 100 ton 2 masted deep sea fishing sampan similar to contact No. 1 with same type of "shear legs" foremast.

Contact Number: 3
Date: May 22
Time: 0851 (K)
Position: 29-10N - 139-39E.
Course: Circling
Speed: - - -
Description: Similar to above and probably same vessel as contact #2.

Case 3

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

No Heading.

21/0930 May

From: Imperial Headquarters
Warning Service.

SMS #024

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 3. No. A-1 (Cont.)

Friendly submarines will pass through local Hokkaido waters as follows:

(1). Morning of the 27th to the Eastward of Etorofu.
26th, to the West of the Rettoo.
Afternoon of the 25th, in the area to the eastward of Etorofu.
From the afternoon of the 26th to the morning of the 27th to the westward of Rettoo (the Kurila Islands).

HYPO COMMENT: Since we do not find a place name "Rettoo" we assume he refers to the Kurile Islands.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: SAILFISH
CINCPAC
ALL SUBS COPIING
NFM FOX

25/1017 May

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOLLOWING GOES ULTRA TO SAILFISH X COMSUEPAC
SERIAL 82 X DURING THE PERIOD YOU ARE PATROL-
ING VICINITY OF KURIL ISLANDS IT IS EXPECTED
3 OR MORE NIP SUBMARINES WILL BE PASSING INSIDE
KURIL CHAIN ENROUTE EMPIRE TO PARAMUSHIRU X

AS THEY PROBABLY ARE CRUISING ON SURFACE THEY
MIGHT MAKE NICE TARGETS X RED SAILFISH

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 3 (Cont.)

G - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Sailfish

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Not Available.

No. C-2

May 21

0800

Arrived MIDWAY. Received 1100 gallons fuel, 2500 gallons fresh water, 500 gallons battery water, some miscellaneous provisions. Received directions to proceed to area via KURIL ISLANDS, acknowledged this dispatch via Radio Midway and at 1300 departed with plane escort, speed 12 knots and 3 & 4 main engines. Changed date at midnight skipping May 22.

May 22 to 26

In route to station. No remarks.

May 27 to 29

Heavy sea, cold, rain and fog. All times from here on are (-) 10 zone.

May 29

0600

Sighted SHANAGATAN 28 miles away. Could see peaks though surface visibility was only a few miles. Headed thru MUSHIRU KAIYU. After sighting MUSHIRU rocks, submerged proceeding thru straits. Heavy swell, but no current. Surfaced at

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 3 No. C-2 (Cont.)

May 29 (Cont.)

2030 still daylight, rounded RAIKOKE TO and
proceeded down west side of KURILES.
Sea very calm in OKHOTSK SEA.

Case 4

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Base Force 27/1532 May
#4)
TO: (Torishima
Maru)
(Kinjo Maru)
(#1 Kichisho
or Kosei Maru)
(Patrol Boat in
Base Force #4)
(Air Group #902)
INFO: (4th Fleet)
(Truk Harbor
Affairs Section #4)

Tomorrow the 28th, at 0600, the Shoel? Maru with
three other vessels and Choun Maru (escorted by
Asanagi, course 94) enter via South Channel. The
Toya Maru and 2 other vessels (escorted by Sub
Chaser #32, course 33) depart via North Channel.
At 1430 the Ten blanks Maru (course 174) departs
via South Channel.

GI COMMENT: For "Ten blanks Maru" above, T27
271547 May gives Tanyoo Maru,

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 4 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: (4th Base Force) 27/1532 May
TO: (Torishima Maru)
(Sub Chaser #10)

INFO: (Air Group #902)
(Truk Bureau
Construction)
(4th Fleet)
(Truk Harbor Affairs
Section #4)

Only last portion readable.

At 1430, Tenyoo Maru (course 174) will depart
by South Channel.

GI COMMENT: NSS 271404 gives entire translation
except for Tenyoo Maru.

No. A-3

FROM: (Base Force) 27/1532 May
#4) (B)
TO: (Torishima Maru)

(B)
(Kinjo Maru) (A)
(Patrol Boat in
Base Force #4, 5-26) (B)
(Patrol Boat in
Base Force #4, 5-26) (B)
(Air Group #902)
INFO: (Bureau Construction
Tokyo) (C)
(4th Fleet) (B) (Ult.
Hansil) (B).
(Truk Assns. Sect.,
#4) (B)

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case A, No. A-3 (Cont.)

Tomorrow 28/0600 the Shooei Maru and 3 unspecified vessels, escorted by Chocun Maru and Asanagi, enter via South Channel on course 94.

The Sooyoo (Souyon) Maru and 3 others, escorted by Sub Chaser #32, depart via North Channel on course 63.

At 1430 the Tenshoo Maru departs via the South Channel on Course 174 degrees.

GI COMMENT: T2W 271547 and NSS 271404 both gave similar translation of this message. HYPO gets Souyon Maru instead of Tooyoo Maru and course of departure via North Channel as 63 instead of 33.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: SUNFISH
SEADRAGON
INFO: SEAL

27/1803 May

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUNFISH AND SEADRAGON GET THIS ULTRA FROM COMSUBPAC
X INFO SEAL X AT 2100 GCT 27 MAY 5 FOPLARS
MERCHANTMEN TYPE UNKNOWN) 1 IRONWOOD (DESTROYER)
ON COURSE 094 ENTER SOUTH GATE X AND SIMUL-
TANEOUSLY 3 FOPLARS 1 LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) ON
COURSE 033 LEAVE VIA NORTH GATE X AT 0530 GCT
25TH 1 FOPLAR COURSE 174 LEAVES SOUTH CHANNEL

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 4 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Sunfish

Third War Patrol

(No. C-1)

Radio Reception: Radio communications were satisfactory, and all serials were received.

No. C-2

May 27

1336 (I) Close-in reconnaissance of FAIS. Sighted two masts and one hour later identified them as part of a disreputable wooden schooner moored to the buoy off REFINRY POINT. Length 100-150 ft., maximum 200 tons; not worth a torpedo. When close enough to island to see sunbathers on beach, opened out and gave gunnery personnel a look and instructions. (Contact #7)

1834 Sighted bright white light high on island,

1913 believed for navigation. Surfaced 6 miles to westward and shortly sighted two blue-white blinking lights between us and island, 2 to 3 miles away. Possibly patrol vessels though none were seen earlier.

May 28

0046 (I) Closing FAIS at battle stations, sighted white flashing light on mooring buoy and a similar light off western roof. Former was designated

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

May 28 (Cont.)

as a point of aim since it lined up with target area. High bright light seen upon surfacing was not extinguished.

0128 With FAIS now silhouetted in the rising moon opened fire at radar range 7800 yards. First few shots were slightly left of refinery buildings but were quickly spotted on in deflection and from then on all salvos, spotted up and down to cover range. Landed where planned; the last two, spotted down 500 yards, landed in the water. Rooftops were illuminated by shells exploding as they pierced; the tracer feature was valuable. Buoy lights were extinguished on 8th salvo. Having seen evidences of patrols last night and suspecting the presence of armament on FAIS, cleared vicinity at high speed in bright moonlight, after expending 26 rounds of 3 inch high-capacity ammunition, satisfied that the Japs would have some repair work and probably a case of jitters, at least. When expected retaliatory measures were not taken regretted not having expended our full allowance, but did not think it would be healthy to return and start again.

0423 Dived 30 miles north of FAIS and set course for Area.

0930 Surfaced in first choppy seas to date. Strong easterly winds.

1319 Officer-of-the-Deck confirmed sighting periscope which he had previously seen 10 minutes earlier out of the corner of his eye, near our track, distance about

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case L. No. C-2 (Cont.)

May 28 (Cont.)

6000 yards. Swung for low speed. stern shot and took avoiding action. Periscope not sighted again so withheld fire. (Contact #8)

May 29

Received ComSubPac information regarding A/S measures here. To date SD radar has indicated presence of only one plane before plane was sighted. The result is the SUNFISH probably has lookouts second to none. They have had plenty of experience on this patrol. With the SD capable of a maximum 4 miles range, and inconsistent, enemy aircraft can hide in clouds at greater ranges keeping us under observation while enemy subs are directed toward our track. With such a situation and with experience we have had, decided to proceed submerged to TRUK-Saipan route, then to close TRUK.

May 31

Arrived on TRUK-Saipan route at Lat. 10° 40' N., Long. 149° 15' E., and set course for TRUK.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No:	7
Time and Date:	1336 (I) - May 27
Position:	Fais Island
Course and Speed:	Moored
Type:	Wooden schooner- Sailing vessel - Maximum 200 tons
Remarks:	- - -

ORIGINAL

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Case A, No. C-3 (Cont.)

No: 8
Time and Date: 1319 (I) - May 28
Position: 10-08 N., 141-21 E.
Course & Speed: - - -
Type: Periscope
Remarks: Near our track distance
6000 yards.

U.S.S. Seadragon

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: NPM Fox schedules were received
with no difficulty.

No. C-5

May 24

0100 (L) Commenced patrolling across lane
thirty miles wide bearing 195°
from SOUTH PASS of TRUK.

May 26

0600 (L) Dived.
1926 (L) Surfaced. Searchlight from TRUK
again trained on our bearing shortly
after we surfaced.
1000 (L) Sighted four engine patrol plane astern,
altitude 2° distance 15 miles, flying
down our course line.
1004 (L) Dived.
1025 (L) Surfaced. Continued chase.
1113 (L) Plane contact on SD radar 20 miles.
2030 (L) Gave up chase, due to the fact had
to reduce the load appreciably on
three remaining engines, due to
high temperatures and position showed
that it was useless to continue chase.

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Case A, No. C-5 (Cont.)

May 27 (Cont.)

Headed back toward TRUK.

May 28

- 0940 (L) Plane contact on SD radar, distance 13 miles. Sighted four engine patrol plane, elevation 10° on southerly course. At this time we noticed a phenomena of the SD radar which was new to us - described under REMARKS.
- 1349 (L) Dived. UMAN ISLAND distance 15 miles.
- 1822 (L) Sighted masts of ship bearing 330 T. Commenced approach.
- (Contact #2) Closed range to 14,000 yards, estimated his course to be 185° and speed 12 knots. No chance of making an attack before dark. Upper works and stack visible still hull down. Decided to trail and attack that night.
- 1945 (L) Surfaced and commenced chasing ship.
- 2040 (L) Sighted lights of ship ahead.
- 2300 (L) Identified ship as MIZUHO MARU, properly marked for a hospital ship. In addition had a red cross of red lights on both sides of his stack.
- 2305 (L) Headed back towards TRUK.

May 29

- 0554 (L) Dived.
- 1240 (L) Sighted two-engine patrol plane, distance twelve miles on course 000°.
- 1942 (L) Surfaced. Usual searchlight trained on our bearing. No patrol boats sighted this day, bad visibility.

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Case 4, No. C-5 (Cont.)

No. C-6

Description of Contact

No:	2
Date and Time:	1822 (L) - May 28
Position:	Lat. 7-00 N., Long 151-55 E.
Type:	MFN Passenger Freighter
Course:	185°
Speed:	12 knots
Remarks:	Later identified as hospital ship <u>Mizuho Maru</u> , properly marked.

U.S.S. Seal

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: Reception was not satisfactory while on station. At Palau reception was impossible due to distance. At Truk consistent reception was impossible due to strong local radio interference on nearby frequencies. Last serial received was Serial 7. Last Dispatch sent was 011025. Serial 72 was missed.

No. C-8

May 26

0448 (J) Submerged 10 miles southeast of
MURIO ISLAND.

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Case 4, No. C-8 (Cont.)

0914 (J) Surfaced. Set course to gain position on line from NORTH PASS to passage between NOMWIN and EAST PAYU ISLANDS.

May 27

0445 (J) Submerged. Lat. 8-40 N. Long. 151-31 E. Set course for point of departure from area.

1518 (J) Sighted plane bearing 140°T., close aboard.

1911 (J) Surfaced.

Case 5

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

Timed at 0330 on 28th May Northern patrol units HOMUNE and MOSZU originated identical contact reports of enemy submarine (TESU TESU TESU) in posit 37-50 N, 148-00E. addressed to Northern Force. At 0410 and 20 respectively each sent simple cipher despatch "Previously reported submarine is friendly". Presence Japanese submarine and 2 picket boats in above position is indicated.

B - Operational Dispatches

NO. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: PCGY

27/2345 May

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 5, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA X SERIAL 80 X STRONG INDICATIONS 2
ENEMY PATROL BOATS AND 1 ENEMY SUBMARINE IN
POSITION 37-50 NORTH 148 EAST TODAY X WATCH
YOUR STEP WHEN PASSING THIS VICINITY

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Pogy

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was not complete.
ComSubPac serial 83 was missed
on 25 May.

No. C-2

May 27

Submerged patrol off shore.
0028 (I) Doubtful radar contact at 4000 yards,
probably sampan. Radar lost contact,
almost immediately and did not regain
it.

May 28

Submerged patrol along Tokyo-Kiska-Attu
route.
2000 (I) Sent message to CTF 17 regarding
departure from area. Proceeded to
NE corner of area.

Case 6

A - Source of Intelligence

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 6, (Cont.)

No. A-1

FROM:

28/1810 May

TO:

(Torishima
Maru) (B)

(Patrol Boat
in Base Force 4) (B)
(Patrol Boat in
Base Force 4) (B)

INFO:

(Truk Harbor
Affairs Section 4) (B)

Arrivals tomorrow 29th May via the North Channel: At 0600, the Hayasaki on course 221 degrees. At 0900, the Unyou, Chuuyou, Kashima, Tikusi, Umikaze and Ushio on course 119 degrees.

Departures via the North Channel: At 0600, Hiyoishi Maru escorted by Minesweeper #8 on course 280 degrees.

No. A-2

FROM:

(Base Force

28/1910 May

#4)

TO:

(Torishima Maru)

(Kinjo Maru)

(Patrol Boat in

Base Force #4)

(#1 Kichisho

Maru)

INFO:

(Garbled)

(4th Fleet)

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 6, No. A-2 (Cont.)

*Entries tomorrow, the 29th.
Via North Channel: at 0600 Hayasaki (course 281).
At 0900 Unyo, Chuyo, Kasima, Chikushi, Umikaze,
Ushio (Course 219).
At 0600, the Kiyoshi Maru (escorted by
Minesweeper #8. Course 280, scheduled depart
via North Channel.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
SUBFISH
INFO: CINCPAC

28/1742 May

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS ULTRA X 2 OAKS WITH 1 COTTONWOOD AND 3
IRONWOODS DUE ARRIVE NORTH CHANNEL AT 0600
GCT 29TH X COURSE 219

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Sunfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio communications were satis-
factory and all serials were
received.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 6 (Cont.)

No. C-2

May 28, 29, 31

Ses V, Case 4, C-2.

June 1

Entered area. No. 2 H.P. air
compressor out of commission; air
leak in air cooler, 3rd stage.
Replaced faulty coil with spare.

Case 7

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (At Truk)(C) 29/1100 May
TO: (Palao Supply
Section of 2nd
Escort Force)(A)
INFO: (Office Naval
Intelligence)(B)
(4th Fleet)(B)

#7291 convoy blank (escorted by Minesweep #
blank) depart Truk at 0430 (J time) to arrive
at 1200 the 2nd. Noon positions:

29th 7-55 N., 150-53 E.

30th 7(?) -38 N, 146-45 E.

31st 7-35 N, 142-38 E.

1st 7-25 N, 138-25 E.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 7 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: FINBACK
INFO: CINCPAC

30/1745 May

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FINBACK GETS THIS ULTRA FROM COMSUBPAC SERIAL
92 X PECAN WITH 1 LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X
BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 X PLUS 15 X
ZPAR 3845 (7-38 NORTH 146-45 EAST) ALBACORE X
ZFYH 3538 (7-35 NORTH 142-38 EAST) X ZFEU 2525
(7-22 NORTH 138-25 EAST) X ARRIVES AT RAMPARTS YOU
WATCH AT 0030 GCT 2ND

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Finback

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet
Serials 72 (May) and 23 (June)
were missed. These were not
requested as they did not concern
us.

No. C-2

May 30

Conducted submerged patrol southeast
of entrances to Malakal Harbor. The
sea was glassy smooth. On surfacing,
patrolled across traffic lane from

ORIGINAL

10 December 1945

Case 7. No. C-2 (Cont.)

May 30 (Cont.)

Anguar Island to Truk.

May 31

Patrolled 5 miles south of entrances to Malakal Harbor. Just as we were coming to periscope depth following a rise for observation, sound reported screws bearing 190° relative. Shortly afterwards heard underwater explosion which was distant, but very heavy; lost propeller noises. On arriving at periscope depth ten minutes after fighting up thru density layers at one third speed, could see nothing.

1000 (I) Heard two noises resembling low order detonations. Nothing in sight.

1900 (I) Surfaced and commenced patrolling along Truk - Palau route on surface.

June 1

1022 (I) Sighted smoke bearing 087° (T).

1034 (I) Dived when it was thought that tops of the ship were visible and we knew his base course. Found we had an AK similar to the TATUKAMI MARU, 7,065 tons, page 71 ONI-208-J and an escort similar to our PC-boats. Although our first attack had proved to be an easy "A-1 practice", this time the Japs were putting their minds to avoiding us. Diagnosed the zig plan as a constant helm. Actually, as we later discovered, the target was doing a constant helm superimposed on a regular zig plan which kept him off of this base course most of the time.

(Contact
#6 - 7)

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 7, No. C-2 (Cont.)

June 1 (Cont.)

The total of our efforts to reach a firing position a spot 2,500 yards from his track with a good sized gyro angle. Decided not to fire with such a poor shot we could easily get him tonight (no moon) when he stopped zigging.

- 1346 (I) Surfaced and commenced trailing.
- 1857 (I) Went ahead four engine speed to close target to radar range.
- 2010 (I) Contacted target on radar at 15,300 yards. Tracking showed that target had fooled us and was still zig zagging.
- 2055 (I) Commenced rounding target for position ahead. Although there was no moon, the sky was bright with stars and there were very few clouds around the horizon. Light conditions were poor for a surface attack and poorer for a submerged attack.

June 2

- 0400 (I) Picked up land about entrance to Malakal Harbor, at seventeen miles. Gradually let target close.
 - 0443 (I) Picked up shape which looked like a patrol boat ahead while our target was astern of us, so dived and started approach.
 - 0512 (I) Fired three torpedo spread with 180° port track, speed on 11 3/4 knots, and actual range of 1,150 yards. All torpedoes were set on 15 feet. The first torpedo hit amidships with a terrific explosion, but the second and third torpedoes missed. The second torpedo was track ahead of the screws by sound. The target's screws were not heard after
- (Attack #2)

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Case 7, No. C-2 (Cont.)

June 2 (Cont.)

the torpedo explosion. It is believed that the target was drawing less than was estimated and the one hit was an influence explosion. The other two torpedoes probably ran too deep. Although the target was not seen to sink and cannot be credited as such, it is believed that there is a strong possibility a torper hit amidships sank him.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

Contact No: 6
Date Local: 6/1/43
Position: 07-24 N., 138-07 E.
Type: Escort vessel. Similar to our PG-451.
Sighted: 12,000
Closest: 2,500
Course: 267°
Speed: 12 knots
Remarks: - - - - -

Contact No: 7
Date Local: 6/1/43
Position: 07-24 N., 138-07 E.
Type: Freighter. Similar to Tatukani Maru
Sighted: 20,000
Closest: 2,500
Course: 267°
Speed: 12 knots
Remarks: Attacked - 1 torper hit.

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Case 8

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Base 30/1607 May
Force 4) (B)
TO: (#2 Takunan
Maru) (B)
(#2 Nozhiro
Maru) (B)
(Patrol Boat
in Base Force 4) (B)
(Patrol Boat in
Base Force 4) (B)
(Southeast Area
Fleet) (A)
INFO: (2nd Fleet) (B)
(Truk Harbor
Affairs Section) (B)

Tomorrow the 31st at 0500, Kiyonami and at 1500
Hayazaki (course 173) depart via South Channel.

1630, Genyoo Maru (course 290) depart via North
Channel.

Daitoo Maru and Taiyoo Maru (escorted by
Hiyodori, course 110) and will arrive via
North Channel; time not known.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC 30/1740 May
TO: SURFISH
PRIORITY: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

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Case 8, No. B-1 (Cont.)

THIS GOES ULTRA IN A HURRY TO SUNFISH ... X
062 POPCORN X 1243 X BLANK X MINUS 430 X PLUS
16 X ZFSM 4147 (7-41 N 151-47 E)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Sunfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio communications were satisfactory and all serials were received.

No. C-2

May 29

Received Comsubpac information regarding A/S measures here. To date SD radar has indicated presence of only one plane before plane was sighted. The result is that SUNFISH probably has lookouts second to none. They have had plenty of experience on this patrol. With the SD capable of a maximum 4 miles range, and inconsistent, enemy aircraft can hide in clouds at greater ranges keeping us under observation while enemy subs are directed toward our track. With such a situation and with experience we have had, decided to proceed submerged to TRUK - SAIPAN route, then to close TRUK.

May 31

Arrived on TRUK-Saipan route at Lat. 10° 40' N., Long. 149° 15' E., and set course for Truk.

ORIGINAL
10 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-2 (Cont.)

June 1

Entered area. No. 2 H.P. air compressor out of commission; air leak in air cooler, 3rd stage. Replaced faulty coil with spars.

June 2

Patrolled HADDON'S "Thrill a minute" area and between HALL and NAMONUITO ISLANDS, previous patrols having shown greatest number of contacts in this area. Will close NORTH PASS June 4th if no contacts are made here.

